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Author’s Note 
 
I first heard about the Bolivian women’s mining movement while studying abroad 
in Bolivia. 1 Inspired by the courage and leadership of those involved, I made it my 
priority to learn more about their activism. I quickly found and read two books that tell 
the history of the movement through the voices of the women who participated: Let Me 
Speak by Domitila Chungara and Moema Viezzer and Nos hemos forjado así (We Were 
Forged This Way) edited by María Lagos. The more I learned about their political 
development during the difficult and violent decades of the 60s, 70s, and 80s the more 
engrossed I became. When it came time to pick a topic for a month-long project at the 
conclusion of my time abroad, the mining women’s movement was an easy choice.  
  During this independent project I had the opportunity to meet many of these 
women (at this point women activists from the Bolivian mines had become celebrities for 
me). I am so grateful to have had the opportunity to personally interview Doña Zenobia 
Machicado, Doña Emiliana Reyes, Doña Dora Aporto, Doña Basilia Quiroz, and Doña 
Zulma Rojas from the mining district Huanuni, Doña Miriam Rojas from the mining 
district of Cami, and Doña Gumercinda Velasco and Doña Domitila Chungara from Siglo 
                                                      
1
 Mining women or members of the women miners’ movement, for the most part, did not actually 
work in the mines. Usually they were the wives of miners, but miners’ daughters and other 
women who identified with mining centers are also referred to as “mining women.” 
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XX, who died in March 2012 from lung cancer.2 Through these interviews, I received 
firsthand accounts of the enormously influential political activism that these women led 
and participated in.3 Listening to their stories, I felt profoundly inspired by their solidarity 
and fighting-spirit in the face of shocking political and economic oppression. My 
continued fascination with their struggle convinced me to turn this project into my senior 
thesis. 
After spending over a year reviewing their testimonies and piecing together their 
activism, I feel indebted to them for sharing their oral histories. In addition to recognizing 
all of the mining women who shared their stories with me, I would also like to 
acknowledge a few other key mentors from my study abroad program.  I would like to 
thank Ismael Saavedra, my academic director, for his insight into Bolivian history and 
culture. I also want to recognize Elizabeth Ziade, my project advisor abroad, for 
connecting me with many of the women I interviewed, and Alejandra Ramírez, for first 
introducing me to this topic. I am also grateful to my homestay families and especially 
Alem Maldonado: thank you all for your willingness to help me transcribe interviews for 
hours on end and for warmly accepting to me into your homes during this inspiring and 
challenging process.  
From the United States, I would like to thank my friends Alicia Hendrix, Ariel 
Katz, and Ryan Wheeler and my twin sister Julia Raney. You four are rock stars, and all 
                                                      
2
 I refer to these women throughout my text by their first names only not due to a lack of respect, 
but because I want to make this text easier to read for English speakers. I also refer to the 
protagonists in Lagos’ book by their first names for the same reason. 
3
 I also learned about the new movement they are starting called OMMIBOL (Organization de 
Mujeres Mineras de Bolivia, Organization of Bolivian Female Miners), which is trying to unite 
mining women across the country. When I was there, this movement was having trouble because 
of lack of financial resources. 
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of your edits made my thesis so much stronger. I would also like to thank the Berger 
Institute, the Center for Human Rights Leadership, the Kravis Leadership Institute, and 
the History Department for helping to make my research trip to the International Institute 
of Social History (ISSH) a reality. The ISSH is one of the world’s largest research centers 
in the field of social and economic history and includes archives on social movements 
throughout the world. Fortunately for me, it had an extensive archive on the Federation of 
Bolivian Mine Workers (FSTMB) and the Housewives’ Committee of Siglo XX. 
Traveling to the Netherlands for research was both a thrilling personal adventure and 
very helpful for my research. I am so grateful for this experience.  
Lastly, I would like to acknowledge Professor Frykman. Thank you for your 
humor, spot-on revisions, and for encouraging me to create something that would honor 
all of those who helped me with this work.  
Concerning my finished product I have two hopes for my readers: that they be 
touched by these women’s heroism, and that they finish with a greater awareness of 
Bolivia’s history, struggles, and future. 
 
 
Doña Emiliana and me outside of the mine’s entrance in Huanuni, Bolivia4 
                                                      
4
 Photo by Alem Maldonado. 
  
Introduction: Women from the Bolivian Mines 
 
In late December of 1977, four women from the Bolivian mining center Siglo XX 
made an irrevocable decision; they would commit themselves to an indefinite hunger 
strike until the government complied with their basic human rights demands. A leftist 
political body called The Permanent Assembly of Human Rights of Bolivia in 1978 gave 
a description of the strike’s beginning as well as their demands: 
On the 28 of December in 1977 at 6:00 pm, four women and their 14 children 
began a hunger strike at the Archbishop’s offices in La Paz. They were the wives 
of miners who had been taken prisoner, exiled or fired from their work; one of 
these women was pregnant. They demanded 1) unrestricted amnesty [for all 
political prisoners and exiled people], 2) the reinstatement of fired workers, 3) the 
recommencement of union activity 4) the removal of troops from the mining 
centers.1 
  
The four women – Aurora, Nelly, Angélica, and Luzmila – made these four demands to 
defend their families against the injustices that they and their communities had faced 
since military dictator Banzer had taken power seven years before.  
  Then, on December 31, four days after the mining women had initiated the strike, a 
second group of 11 women joined the strike. They staged their demonstration in the 
offices of the daily Catholic newspaper Presencia in La Paz. This group was made up of 
                                                      
1
 Secretaría Ejecutiva de la Asamblea Permanente de los Derechos Humanos de Bolivia, January 
31, 1978, Cronograma de la huelga de hambre en Bolivia: 28 de deciembre de 1977- 17 de enero 
78, Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores de Bolivia Archives, 000291, International Institute 
of Social History, Amsterdam [hereafter, ISSH].  
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a diverse group of people including relatives of political prisoners, students, and other 
female activists from the Bolivian mines.  The following day, a third group joined the 
protest from the Temple of María Auxilidadora in La Paz. By the 7th of January, the 
number of protesters had swelled to 200, and that number jumped to 500 on January 9th. 
On January 12th, the 17th day of the strike, roughly 1,000 protesters had joined the cause 
from cities across the nation. The majority of the protesters were working class people 
from the mines, students, and religious leaders but professionals and members of other 
sectors of Bolivian society also participated. 2  
  Widespread support for the strike manifested itself in other ways besides the 
number of people participating in the hunger strike. Starting in the beginning of January, 
university students performed daily light vigils in La Paz and Oruro to demonstrate their 
support for the four women’s demands. Miners’ cooperation showed their alliance to the 
protests by going on strike. Other groups including the National Confederation of 
Bolivian Professionals, the radio station called Acuerdo-Prensa, the Union of Bolivian 
Women, and many other groups declared their support for the protesters, forming a 
popular coalition in support of democratic change. Religious leadership also came out in 
support of the protesters. The archbishop of La Paz announced that all religious ceremony 
would be indefinitely suspended until the government met the strikers’ demands.3 
  In response to the growing demand for political liberty from people of diverse 
professional and regional backgrounds, the military government fruitlessly tried to stop 
                                                      
2
 Secretaría Ejecutiva de la Asamblea Permanente de los Derechos Humanos de Bolivia, 
Cronograma de la huelga de hambre. 
3
 Jean-Pierre Lavaud.  La dictadura minada: la huelga de hambre de las mujeres mineras, 
Bolivia, 1977-1978 (La Paz: IEFA, 1998), 10. 
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the country from devolving into political pandemonium. On the 10th of January, the 
government decided to ambiguously respond to the demands of the protesters, and the 
following day the Armed Forces and the police declared a State of Emergency. When 
these tactics failed the government turned to intimidation. On the 16th of January, the 
State issued an ultimatum to the strikers: give up the protest or risk forceful removal from 
their locations.4 At 3:30 am the following night, the government raided the buildings in 
La Paz where most of the prominent protesters staged their strikes and brutally made 
them leave.5  
   The government’s increasingly bold attempts at subduing the strikers did nothing 
to slow the snowballing protests. Instead, the government’s use of force increased the 
protesters’ conviction that the regime needed to be stopped for good. The day after the 
original protesters were arrested, new protesters quickly replaced those who had been 
dragged away. The imprisoned protesters also declared that they would now give up 
drinking in addition to eating, which magnified the urgency of their strike.6  
  Recognizing that it had maneuvered itself into a lose-lose situation, Banzer’s 
military government realized that it had little choice but to agree to the demands of the 
mining women. At 11:30 pm on January 17th, the government freed the majority of 
political prisoners. The following day, the state reinstated fired miners and promised no 
further persecution.7 On January 24th, labor unions came out of hiding. However, troops 
remained in the Bolivian mines. Domitila Chungara, a leading female activist from Siglo 
                                                      
4
 Jiménez and Cajías, Mujeres de las minas, 151. 
5
 Lavaud, La dictadura minada, 10. 
6
 Ibid., 10. 
7
 Jiménez and Cajías, Mujeres de las Minas de Bolivia, 151. 
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XX who was part of the second group of protesters to join the strike, beamed over the 
protests accomplishments: “We had four demands. Three were accepted, one was not. 
But three were. If just one of our demands had been answered it would have been an 
enormous triumph.”8 
 
The radical success of this hunger strike transformed these four women into 
national icons for social justice. It also brought national attention for the mining women’s 
larger political movement. Geroma, another activist who came from Siglo XX, 
emphasized the importance of remembering this strike only in the context of mining 
women’s greater struggle to liberate their community. She explained: 
When they say, thanks to four women we have democracy. Thanks to four women 
we overthrew General Banzer, it’s not correct. It was not just those four women. 
For the rest of my life I am going to thank Señora Alicia de Escobar, Señora 
Domitila Chungara, la Senora Elena de Enriquez and all of the other women who 
knew how to fight, who didn’t know how to give up, for bringing democracy.9 
 
Geroma’s statement, by pointing out that these women did not operate alone but 
were actually part of a much broader struggle, paints a much more accurate picture of 
mining women’s activism in Bolivia during this period. Prior to the strike, mining women 
from different mining centers across Bolivia campaigned tirelessly and at great personal 
risk to end their people’s oppression under various military dictatorships. Over time, their 
commitment to defending their communities from extreme exploitation and political 
oppression enabled them to develop into formidable political actors – political actors that 
                                                      
8
 Domitila Chungara, interview by Catherine Raney, trans. by Catherine Raney, December 1, 
2011. 
9
 María Lagos, ed., Nos hemos forjado así: al rojo vivo y a puro golpe, (La Paz: Plural, 2006), 
121, trans. by Catherine Raney.  
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were strong enough to lead a protest that left a seven-year military regime no choice but 
to call for immediate public elections. 
Mining women’s experience as hardened political activists may at first seem 
paradoxical considering the deeply patriarchal nature of mining society and the nation as 
a whole during this period. Tracing mining women’s activism back to the development of 
male miners’ unions in Bolivia helps explain this contradiction. The male miners’ 
movement, which was led by the FSTMB (Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Mineros 
de Bolivia or Union Federation of Bolivian Mine Workers), was the most powerful 
working class movement in the country starting around the mid-20th century. The 
FSTMB represented the working class and played an instrumental role in the People’s 
Revolution in 1952. Later, when the revolutionary period began to unravel in the early 
1960s, the relationship between the ruling party and the miners’ unions became 
increasingly strained. Then, when Bolivia entered a period of military dictatorships (1964 
– 1978), the miners’ movement continued to act as the national government’s main 
political opponent.  
As might be expected, initially the miners did not allow women to participate in 
their movement. Due to the fact that most women did not work directly in the mines, the 
workers movement felt justified in excluding women. Other patriarchal norms that 
confined women to the home reinforced their conviction that women had no place in 
national politics.  
This traditional assumption came under fire during the end of the revolutionary 
period. At this time, tensions between the mining centers and the national government 
escalated dramatically.  Starting in the early 1960s the government began implementing 
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austere economic packages and imprisoning working class leaders to reduce the miners’ 
power and deal with the nation’s crashing economy. This conflict between the working 
class and the national government intensified when Bolivia entered into a period 
controlled by military dictatorships from 1964 to 1978. When military dictatorships 
controlled the country, the government often militarized mining centers, imprisoned and 
deported working class leaders, and used terror and violence in the mining communities 
to quell resistance to its rule. This backdrop of oppression motivated mining women to 
become involved in politics for the first time and then develop their own political 
committees called the Housewives’ Committee. Domitila, who became the figurehead of 
the movement, explained how their communities’ suffering caused women miners to 
break down patriarchal barriers that had previously denied them a voice in public politics 
and become powerful activists. She reflected: 
Every month we cried on payday. There wasn’t enough money for anything, not 
anything. One of my children didn’t have any shoes, the other didn’t either. We 
were bundled up but we were cold. And so every one of my children had started 
to work. In this way my children stopped being children. Aside from this, all the 
time the military came to the mines and killed their fathers, violated their mothers. 
My children did not have a good childhood. It was for this reason that we [the 
women] had to do something…. These injustices gave us our strength. To start 
strikes, to start marches, protests, it was always this.10 
 
The women’s movement gained membership, strength, and respect until the mid-
1980s. By this point Bolivia was again controlled by civilians, and the democratic 
government decided to shut down mining centers across Bolivia to address the nation’s 
fiscal crisis. This action brought the women’s movement, and the male miners’ 
movement, to an abrupt end.  
                                                      
10
 Chungara, interview by Raney. 
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Despite mining women’s relative absence from Bolivian politics for the last thirty 
years, they helped create a new political culture that recognized the importance of both 
women’s participation in politics and human rights. Today, this culture lives on. Bolivia 
has not experienced a coup since 1980, and the nation’s human rights record has 
improved dramatically since the 80s as well. Women also continue to occupy critical 
roles in Bolivian politics. Today, a new generation of women activists has stepped into 
the political void carved out and then vacated by the Housewives’ Committees. A few 
examples of such movements are UMBO (Union of Bolivian Women), and Mujeres 
Creando (Women Creating), an anarchist feminist group, and Bartolina Sisa, an 
indigenous women’s movement that is perhaps the most powerful Bolivian women’s 
group today. 11  
 
To explain the development of this incredible women’s movement and its broad 
legacy, this work is divided in three parts. The first chapter explores the rise of mining 
women’s activism, from 1961 - 1964. This period was characterized by miners’ 
increasing disillusionment with the national government, as well as the return of class 
conflict between the working class and those who controlled the government.  Chapter 2 
delves into the Housewives’ Committee’s development when Bolivia was controlled by 
military dictatorships. These regimes abused mining centers intensely, but women miners 
continued to develop strategies for resistance. Ultimately these strategies enabled women 
to be victorious in the strike of 1977.  
                                                      
11
 “Entrevista a Zenobia Machicado Dirigente De Comites De Amas De Casa Mineras Y De 
Bartolinas," interview by Alejandra Ramirez, July 27, 2011. 
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The last chapter addresses the women miners’ movement once Bolivia began its 
imperfect transition to democracy. After explaining the disappointing democratization 
process and the mining movement’s abrupt ending, this chapter explores the important 
successes of the women’s movement: not only did they help create a culture that 
respected people’s human rights, but the Housewives’ Committee also successfully 
negotiated space for women in Bolivian national politics.   
The bulk of the information in this work comes from personal interviews from 
women who were part of this movement. Much of its analysis also draws on documents 
from the Institute of Social History in Amsterdam. This archive has a large section on 
Domitila Chungara, which held significant information from Housewives’ Committees 
throughout Bolivia. Some of the documents in this archive include declarations about 
different political demonstrations, letters written by one Housewives’ Committee to 
another, as well as more personal documents including personal testimony about specific 
brutal experiences. These documents, combined with my personal interviews, helped 
build an on-the-ground history of these women’s political activism and development.  
  Secondary sources have also been instrumental for the creation of this project, 
especially in conceptualizing the impact that this movement had both on the women who 
participated and Bolivian politics at large. Specifically, Moema Viezzer’s introduction to 
Let Me Speak, as well as the article she co-wrote entitled “El Comité de Amas de Casa de 
Siglo XX: An Organizational Experience of Bolivian Women” were crucial to 
understanding the way that women’s activism enabled women to see their own labor as 
productive. June Nash’s article, “The Barzolas and the Housewives’ Committee,”  proved 
key to organizing the diversity of women’s activism, and María Lourdes’ book, Nosotras 
12 
 
 
 
en democracia: mineras, cholas, y feministas (Women in Democracy: Mining Women, 
Cholas and Feminists)  helped to explain how women’s entrance into politics allowed 
them to develop a shared consciousness of their subordination. María Loudres’s book 
also contextualized their movement into the broader story of the development of powerful 
women’s organizations in Bolivia, which strengthened the analysis of their movement’s 
legacy. 
Remembering the Bolivian mining women’s movement is meaningful for many 
reasons. Firstly, their movement was instrumental in the fight to bring democracy to 
Bolivia, and undeniably altered Bolivian culture to be more accepting of women’s 
participation in politics. It also led to a number of important personal realizations 
amongst women that had important replications for the nation at large. Third, their 
movement serves as an illustrative case study to examine the relationship between gender 
and class struggle, a relationship that remains enormously relevant to contemporary 
Bolivian society. 
 Lastly, this analysis is important for a North American audience specifically 
because it provides an on-the-ground look at how US foreign policy in Latin America 
impacted its most vulnerable populations. Both the United States’ anti-communist 
agendas in the 60s and 70s and the “shock therapy” economic recommendations in the 
80s had a real (and largely negative) impact on women and their families in the Bolivian 
mines. While most Americans are likely unaware of their nation’s role in recent Bolivian 
history, members of the Bolivian mining community can never forget. 
 
 
  
Chapter 1: The Development of Mining Women’s Activism (1961-1964) 
 
I. Mining Women’s Activism During the Revolutionary Period 
Women from the Bolivian mines entered the unfamiliar world of politics with a bang at 
the end of Bolivia’s revolutionary period. Bolivia’s People’s Revolution took place in 1952, and 
many expected this revolution to radically reshape Bolivia’s highly unequal society. Despite 
these high expectations, by the late 1950s it became clear that the political party in power had no 
intention of completely restructuring Bolivian society. This caused the relationship between the 
national government and the working class to unravel in the late 1950s and early 1960s. While 
tensions between the mining centers and the national government spiked, women from the 
mining center Siglo XX held their first ever organized political demonstration. In 1961, they 
staged a hunger strike in La Paz, Bolivia’s capital, to force the government to listen to their 
demands. This strike marked one of the first times in Bolivia and even Latin America that 
women came together in an independently organized political experience.1 Over the course of 
their demonstration, women stood up to church authority and state terror and did not return home 
until the government had acted on all of their demands.  
The far-reaching success of their political demonstration opened up debate regarding 
women’s proper role in politics. After the strike, the FSTMB, or the national miners’ union 
endorsed women’s participation in politics for the first time. The strike’s success also impacted 
the women personally; after returning from La Paz, the strikers had the confidence to found the 
                                                      
1
 June Nash, “The Barzolas and the Housewives’ Committee” in Women and Change in Latin America, 
ed. June Nash and Hellen Icken Safa (South Hadley, MA: Bergin & Garvey, 1986), 327. 
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Housewives’ Committee. This organization guided mining women’s activism for the next several 
decades.   
 As the relationship between the mining centers and the leading political party became 
increasingly strained, mining women gained experience as activists. Notably, in June of 1963, 
women from the Bolivian mines again demonstrated their commitment and usefulness to 
working class politics. After miners spontaneously kidnapped seventeen people – six foreigners 
and eleven Bolivians – women from the Housewives’ Committee of Siglo XX offered to stand 
guard over the hostages while the miners bargained with the national government. Like in the 
case of the 1961 hunger strike, this experience showed working class activists that women could 
be counted on in the violent and unpredictable world of Bolivian national politics. The political 
development of women participants during this incident also symbolized a widespread shift 
regarding working class women’s role in politics: shortly after the march of 1961, Housewives’ 
Committees began to pop up in mining centers across Bolivia.  As this network grew, women 
activists began to rely on other Housewives’ Committees for the success of their own political 
demonstrations.  
Mining women’s confrontation with gender norms that traditionally barred women from 
politics begs the question: why did impoverished women from mining centers, an extremely 
patriarchal society, initiate these changes? The answer lies in the political and economic 
oppression of their communities. By the end of the revolutionary period, the disintegrating 
cooperation between the miners unions and the national government caused many mining 
women to feel that the mining centers could no longer afford to have women remain indifferent 
to the broader struggle of the working class. This new political awareness combined with the 
15 
 
 
 
horrific working conditions of their husbands’ pushed women to break free of their traditional 
roles.  
 
II: Historical Context for Women’s Decision to Organize: The Relationship Between the 
Mining Centers and the State 
The antagonistic relationship between the mining centers and the national government 
predated mining women’s entrance into formal politics by several centuries. Miners had 
experienced centuries of forced labor under Spanish colonialism, which dated back to the 
discovery of silver mines in Bolivia in the late 16th century. The exploitation of mine workers 
continued after Bolivia’s independence in 1820 and lasted into the 20th century. During the 20th 
century, three mine owners Simón Patiño, Carlos Aramayo and Moritz Hochschild, who were 
known as Tin Barons, controlled two thirds of the country’s tin.2 The Tin Barons were among the 
richest men in Latin America (Patiño, who was known as the Tin King, was the fifth richest man 
in the world by his death in 1947), but their workers lived at or below a subsistence level. 3  
Faced with these extreme inequalities, miners began to develop a sense of class identity 
at the turn of the 20th century. By the 1920s, miners began to organize politically and press for 
better working conditions.4 The development of miners’ organized resistance frequently led to 
violent repression by the government and mining companies. Most infamously, on December 
21st, 1942, 400 children, workers and women were killed in a confrontation with the company. In 
this battle, mining woman María Barzola led the march against the armed forces, and eventually 
                                                      
2
 Kendall W. Brown, A History of Mining in Latin America: From the Colonial Era to the Present 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2012), 127. 
3
 Ibid., 127. 
4
 Ibid., 142. 
16 
 
 
 
sacrificed her life in protest for more food and better living conditions for her children.5 Over 
time she grew to be a symbol of the struggle against exploitation, and the field where she died 
was named after her in 1952.6,7 To better protect themselves against future attacks, in 1944 
miners founded the FSTMB, a mining labor movement that grew to be one of the most powerful 
political organizations in the country.  
Outside of the mines, middle class Bolivians including intellectuals and working 
professionals were also growing increasingly frustrated with the political system that was 
dominated by the old elite. The elite class was made up of landowners and large company 
holders who frequently lived abroad and held de facto control of the military.8 Eager to do away 
with this unjust system, members of the middle class founded the MNR (Movimiento 
Nacionalista Revucionario or the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement) in 1941, and developed 
a plan to ignite a people’s revolution. In April, the MNR joined forces with the miners’ unions 
and the peasants with the intention of overthrowing the current government. During this uprising, 
Bolivian miners’ militias played a crucial role. In just three days, this grand alliance 
overwhelmed the military and overthrew the old oligarchy. People across Bolivia understood the 
revolution to be a momentous win for the common people of Bolivia.9  
                                                      
5
 Rene Santander, Victor Mansilla and Abel Villapando, Saludos de los Trabajadores Mineros de La 
Comision de Base del Sindicato Locotarios, Varios Documentos de la Resistencia a la dictaura de Banzer, 
1974-1978, Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores de Bolivia Archives, 00884, ISSH. 
6
 Domitila Barrios de Chungara, and Moema Viezzer. Let Me Speak!: Testimony of Domitila, a Woman 
from the Bolivian Mines, trans. Victoria Ortiz (New York: Monthly Review, 1978), 15.  
7
 Iván Jiménez Chávez and Magdalena Cajías de la Vega, Mujeres de las minas de Bolivia (La Paz: 
Ministerio de Desarollo Humano, 1997), 85. 
8
 Merilee Grindle and Pilar Domingo, eds., Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective 
(London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 2003), 3.  
9
 Herbert S. Klein, A Concise History of Bolivia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 213 – 
216. 
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  The first years following the revolution were indeed ones of victory for Bolivian mine 
workers and the peasants. Important concessions to the peasants, who made up 70 percent of the 
population, came quickly: on July 21st the government declared universal suffrage and on August 
2nd, the government began to redistribute lands to organized peasant groups. 10 Key victories for 
the miners came slightly later: on October 31st of 1952, the MNR nationalized the large tin mines 
previously owned by the Tin Barons.11 The government then granted miners the right to “co-
govern” COMIBOL (Corporación Minera de Bolivia), the new state enterprise designed to 
control the nationalized mines, which gave workers the power to veto all of COMIBOL’s 
decisions.12  Domitila discussed what “co-government” meant for the miners:  
Worker control by law had been created in 1953 by the MNR, when the mines were 
nationalized, so that the company’s activities could be controlled: how much tin was 
taken out, how much profits were taken in, how they were distributed, how marketing 
contracts were made, or the grocery store contacts, and so on. It meant the mines were in 
the hands of the people, because worker control functioned through a freely elected 
representative.13  
This unprecedented transfer of power to the miners was cause for celebration. It seemed as if the 
five-century long tradition of exploiting Bolivian workers for mineral wealth was over and that 
the relationship between the miners and the state would now be characterized by cooperation 
rather than antagonism. This belief was reinforced by the creation of the COB (Central Obrera 
Boliviana or National Trade Union Federation). The government granted the COB semi-
autonomous power with the MNR over the workers of Bolivia. Serious cuts in the size and 
funding of the military reinforced these new social and economic changes. 14 
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   This enormous shift in the balance of power led to the development of a profound class-
consciousness and pride in the Bolivian mines. Their new semi-autonomous political status 
strengthened a sense of shared identity in the mines. However, economic tensions proved that the 
alliance between the state, the peasants and the miners was sewn together with thin thread. All of 
the miners’ gains would soon be threatened. 15 
  Relations between the government and organized labor began to unravel starting in 1956.16 
Immediately after the 1952 Revolution, the Bolivian economy experienced explosive inflation; 
between 1952 and 1956 the cost of living increased twentyfold and the annual inflation reached 
over 900 percent.17 Facing a looming economic catastrophe, the MNR had to make a choice 
between continuing to support increased economic and political freedom of the miners or 
implementing more conservative economic policies to prevent the urban middle class from 
turning against them. Domitila articulated the working class’ growing disillusionment with the 
government during this period:  
In those years that the MNR governed Bolivia, first with Paz Estenssoro, then Hernán 
Siles Zuazo, and then again Paz Estenssoro. That government called itself “revolutionary 
nationalist” and we had put them into office, but it began to not pay any attention to what 
the people said and wanted.18 
  
  Faced with an increasingly resentful armed worker population and pressured by the United 
States, which feared another Cuba-style communist uprising, the government decided to rebuild 
the military.19Tensions between the working class and the national government escalated to a 
breaking point when President Paz Estenssoro was presented with an economic development 
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plan (called the Triangular Plan) to receive $35 million in foreign aid from the United States, the 
Interamerican Development Bank, and West Germany.20 To qualify for this aid, the government 
agreed to lay off over 1,000 workers, lower wages, reduce worker benefits, take control of the 
union process – particularly the activities of the mine leaders – and end worker control in 
COMIBOL.21 The strict stipulations designed to reduce the power of leftist labor organizers 
reflects a wider trend in United States foreign policy. In the early 1950s, the United States began 
to intervene in Latin American countries to prevent the spreading of leftist and communist ideas. 
Worker control was the exact type of situation that the United States hoped to stop, and this 
economic package with strings attached seemed the best way to halt the alliance between the 
workers and the government. 
Seeing no other way to deal with the nation’s tanking economy and increasingly 
disgruntled middle class, the Bolivian government agreed to implement the policies outlined in 
the economic package. The adoption of this plan, called the “Strangular Plan” by mine union 
leader Federico Escobar, ignited a sense of betrayal among the now very class-conscious laborers 
from the mines. 22  Domitila discussed how the government’s decision to turn to international 
donors led to a sense of indignation among mine workers across the country. She explained: 
Our MNR governments didn’t want to listen to us; instead, through the U.S. Embassy, 
they made plans and imposed their policies. They decreed a “monetary stabilization” and 
they made the “Triangular Plan,” all to their advantage. And when the workers opposed 
this, immediately there was a crackdown. In those days we suffered quite a lot in Siglo 
XX because of their policies.23 
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III. Women from Siglo XX Stage Their First Hunger Strike in La Paz 
Under these stressful conditions, women of the Bolivian mining center Siglo XX turned 
to organized political action for the first time. The tipping point of the women’s decision to 
organize occurred in early June when the miners’ union of the mining center Siglo XX organized 
a march to La Paz, a 360 km walk, to challenge the Triangular Plan. Before they could begin, the 
MNR learned about the march and preemptively captured the union’s leaders as well as other 
workers. The government then sent all captured activists to jail in La Paz.24 
In protest, one by one the wives of imprisoned miners traveled to the capital. There, they 
pleaded with the government to release their husbands. The government ignored their demands. 
Domitila described the women’s initial failure to free their husbands: “But in La Paz the women 
were treated badly, and [government officials] even tried to put [the women] in jail and abuse 
them.”25Alone each woman returned, feeling demoralized, and unsuccessful.  
  Upon hearing about each others’ failures, sixty mining women decided to act together. 
Geroma, a woman who participated in the female miners’ movement from its beginning, 
explained that after these individual failures, they voiced a new idea: “If instead of going like 
that, each on her own, we all went together and went to claim our rights in La Paz, what would 
happen? Maybe we could all take care of each other and get better results.”26  With this 
collective mentality, the frustrated women set out to devise a plan. 
  Just as the women of Siglo XX began to organize an ad hoc committee, all of the 
housewives of Siglo XX received an announcement over the radio stations La Voz de Minero 
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(The Miner’s Voice) and La Pío III. Radios were the only form of communication that miners 
could use to communicate with the entire community or other mining centers, and they were 
frequently used to communicate important messages. The announcement requested that all of the 
women come for a meeting in the local parish. At this time part of the church’s mission was to 
defeat communism (the church hierarchy did not become allies to the working class movement 
until the mid-70s).27 As a result, it is no surprise that Monsignor Manrique used this meeting as 
an opportunity to discourage the women from organizing. Geroma explained that he told the 
group of women, “‘Women should stay at home taking care of their children, tending to the 
home and should not involve themselves in male activities’… [But] the majority [of the women] 
wanted to intervene. In response to his request, the Monsignor received an emphatic ‘no.”’28  
After rejecting the advice from the Church leader, the women left the parish for the local 
radio station called La Voz Minero. At the local radio station, they worked with leaders of the 
male miners’ union of Siglo XX and members of the Bolivian Communist Party. Together, they 
devised a plan, and appointed a president, and left for the capital.  
  Once in La Paz, the sixty Bolivian mining women began a hunger strike and prepared a 
manifesto. In this manifesto, they demanded the freedom of their union leaders and husbands, 
three months’ worth of payment for their husband’s work, medicine for company-run hospitals 
and food for pulperías or a company-run grocery store. 29   
  Conflict arose when a group of barzolas, a political group of lower class women who the 
MNR used as shock troops to intimidate the masses, came to frighten the strikers. 30 The name of 
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this group came from María Barzola, the woman miner who had died fighting for her people in 
1942. However, MNR barzolas did not stand up to social injustices but were actually used as 
shock troops by the national government to oppress working class activists.31 Domitila 
commented, “That’s why when someone sells out to the government or there’s a female police 
agent people say: ‘Don’t get involved with her, she’s a barzola.’ It’s a shame that this historic 
figure has been so misused.”32 In this case, the Barzolas threw rotten tomatoes and oranges at the 
women from the mines, threatened them with knives and even attempted to take their children 
away from them.33 Eventually the police came to end the fighting.  
  Acts of state-initiated violence continued the night after the strike began. While they 
waited outside of the Parliamentary building, San Román, a man known for torturing those who 
opposed the government, came to threaten the women.  Domitila, who did not become officially 
involved in the committee until two years later, explained what she heard happened between the 
protesters and the torturer on the first night of the strike: 
That night San Román came, that terrible San Román whom no one wanted to meet. One 
of the compañeras stood in front of him and said: “San Román, you know very well that 
we don’t have arms to defend ourselves from your hangmen. But if anything happens, 
we’ll all blow up together, at this very minute. We and you will blow up, because all 
we’ve got here is dynamite.” And she took something out of her pocket and asked for a 
match. But while the compañeras were looking for a match, San Román and his group 
went running out.34  
 
The woman’s threat to blow up the building was a legitimate one. Miners frequently used 
dynamite to extract minerals from the mountain. This meant members of the mining community 
always had a significant supply of this explosive. Rather than risk death at the hands of a 
desperate mother and wife, the infamous San Román decided to run away. 
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   Women from Siglo XX’s presence in La Paz also caught the attention of many other 
groups; because there were very few women’s activist groups at this time, numerous journalist 
groups came to document their activism the morning after their first night in La Paz.35 Many 
other groups, including the Union of Bolivian Women (UMBO) and the Federation of Factory 
Workers upon learning about the strike came to demonstrate their solidarity. In addition, around 
150 women and their children from other mining centers in Bolivia traveled to La Paz to lend 
their aid. These women provided valuable help by preparing food for the children that the 
strikers had brought with them from Siglo XX.36  
  For the next nine days the women continued on their hunger strike, consuming only 
liquids. Then, on the tenth day, the government granted women from Siglo XX all of their 
demands; their husbands and union leaders along with industrial workers and teachers from 
different parts of the country were freed from political prison.37 The government also filled the 
mining center’s grocery stores with food, and the mine workers received their last two months 
wages.38 Reunited with their husbands and union leaders, the women returned to Siglo XX 
triumphant. María Careaga, a woman from Siglo XX explained, “Everyone was waiting for us 
when we arrived. We made a barbeque and we celebrated.”39 Invigorated with a new sense of 
confidence and purpose, women from the hunger strike officially founded the Housewives’ 
Committee of Siglo XX shortly after returning from La Paz.  
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The mining women’s successful hunger strike and their subsequent decision to create a 
permanent Housewives’ Committee was a novel act in Bolivia, and its success motivated 
Bolivians to reassess what women were capable of as political actors. Women had only begun to 
participate in public politics during the rise of the MNR in the1940s, but after the MNR came to 
power the women were pushed into unimportant roles in the government.40 Women’s lack of 
influence in Bolivian politics meant that having women act communally and independently on a 
national level – remember that around 150 women from mining districts across Bolivia traveled 
to La Paz to lend their support – was enormously unusual. The very novelty of their direct 
participation combined with their subsequent success surprised the country. It further convinced 
some people, including a few key members of the FSTMB, or the national miners’ union, to 
change their outlook on women’s participation in politics.  
In reaction to the strike of 1961, the FSTMB adjusted its position on women’s activism. 
On the first of October 1961, the union published a decisive vote saying, “whereas, the 
participation of women is fundamental in the struggle for better conditions in the mines, like they 
demonstrated in the last strike; whereas, it is necessary that housewives are organized in all 
mining centers in Housewives’ Committees like they have already done in Siglo XX to guarantee 
more effective participation in the struggle.”41 This statement marked a huge shift in the miners’ 
union’s attitudes towards women. Prior to this date, miners’ unions had given women little voice 
in the movement, believing women’s work to be less productive and less important.42 These 
resolutions also demonstrate that at least some members of a leading body of the working class 
had accepted that women needed to become politicized before their community could overcome 
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its current state of exploitation, an idea that gained momentum during the next several decades. 43 
  Women’s success in their hunger strike also had important implications for the women 
themselves. During the strike women proved that they were capable of holding their ground in 
the rough world of politics. When the women were developing their plans to stage a protest 
together, they ignored the advice of a church leader who argued vehemently against their 
participation. Their determination to aid their husbands also did not waiver at the threat of state 
violence: when the barzolas tried to intimidate them, the women from Siglo XX stood their 
ground. Later, when the infamous executioner San Ramón came, the women did not disperse 
from fear of torture. Instead, the women threatened to use dynamite, causing him to run away 
rather than the other way around! Women’s ability to overcome these obstacles and succeed 
when their male counterparts had failed enabled women to begin to realize their own capabilities: 
shortly after returning from La Paz, women from Siglo XX had the confidence to establish a 
permanent Housewives’ Committee. Domitila reflected on how the Housewives’ Committee 
enabled women to prove to themselves that they had more political potential than anyone in their 
communities would have thought possible prior to the strike of 1961. She said with pride: “Many 
of my sisters have demonstrated by their actions that they can assume an important role 
alongside the worker.”44  
 
 
IV: Women Earn Respect as Prison Guards 
 
As tensions between the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR) and the mining 
centers continued to escalate, women continued to demonstrate their usefulness to the working 
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class and to gain political experience. Notably, in 1963 women from Siglo XX agreed to guard 
six kidnapped foreigners and eleven Bolivians while the miners bargained with the national 
government. The context for this intense power play began when the government recaptured two 
important union leaders, Federico Escobar and Irineo Pimental. As soon as the miners from Siglo 
XX discovered that their union leaders were taken prisoner, they felt outraged. 45 Then they 
realized that a number of foreigners were having a meeting with upper-level COMIBOL 
management in the town’s center. Eager to retaliate in this very uneven struggle for power, the 
miners decided to kidnap those who were participating in the meeting. Ironically, the foreigners 
were in the area to deliver a $15,000 check to finance two new schools in Siglo XX.46 
  Once the hostages had been taken to the union building, the workers immediately 
dispatched a message to the government. They presented a bargain: the workers would free their 
prisoners in exchange for the freedom of the leaders. Recent repressive policies like the 
Triangular Plan had taught the miners how influential foreign needs were in the tug-o-war of 
power between the national government and the mining centers. This time, the miners hoped to 
use their government’s dependence on a working relationship with the United States to their 
advantage. Surely the government would release their leaders before risking wounding their 
relationship with the United States.  
  However, the Bolivian government led by President Estenssoro refused to be manipulated 
by coercion. Instead, the government communicated the following: there would be no exchange 
of prisoners. Only after the miners released their hostages would the government consider 
releasing the union leaders. 47 
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  After the government’s refusal, the miners heard some more upsetting news; a miner who 
had been present when Federico Escobar and Irineo Pimental were captured explained that he 
had heard a great deal of gunfire during their arrest. The witness assumed that the leaders had 
been killed.48 
   Infuriated, many miners wanted to hang their prisoners. It would be an imperfect 
retaliation, but that was the best option they had. Amidst the chaos, Norberta Aguilar, the current 
president of the Housewives’ Committee, made a reasoned argument: because they had no proof 
that the leaders had been murdered, they needed to keep their hostages alive for bargaining 
power.49 She then offered the Housewives’ Committee to take the lead on guarding over the 
hostages. The miners’ union agreed, and Norberta delivered the following message over the 
radio to all women in the Housewives’ Committee: 
Given the current situation between the national government and the FSTMB, the 
Housewives’ Committee of Silgo XX urgently requests that all compañeras of Miraflores, 
Socavón, Patiño and Silgo XX help with guard duty in the union building to guarantee 
the security of the foreign hostages while a General Assembly of Workers decides how to 
convince the national government to deliver their hostages to us. Meanwhile, the 
responsibility of the hostages lies in the hands of housewives.50 
 
  A group of about 20 women and some men responded to the message and volunteered to 
participate in guard duty. They came to the union building and held a small meeting. They 
decided to break each day into three shifts, assigning a group of volunteers to different eight-
hour blocks. Other volunteers organized who would bring food to those on guard duty and 
decided how they would feed the families of the guards. Their ability to continue to take care of 
their households while accepting additional political responsibilities would be crucial in 
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overcoming sexism as the Housewives’ Committee started to regularly contribute to the union in 
the years to come. 51 
  Pleased to again be proving themselves useful to the union, María Careaga, who was just 
becoming acquainted with the committee, exclaimed: “Now we are going to show them that we 
women deserve their respect!”52 They then armed themselves with dynamite and guns left over 
from the Chaco War of the early 1930s,53 and then the waiting period began. Some guarded the 
prisoners during the day. Others took the night shift, chewing coca leaves to keep away the 
fatigue and hunger.54  
  Women’s leadership in the kidnapping of foreigners and Bolivians earned significant 
national and international attention.55 A Time reporter described the shocking spectacle: 
 
There the captives sat last week —Martin and three other Americans, a Dutchman, a 
German and eleven Bolivians — frightened and endangered pawns in a medieval power 
struggle high in the Bolivian Andes. Dark-featured Indian women, wives of rebellious tin 
miners, stood guard over them in a shabby union hall at the 14,000-ft.-high Siglo Veinte 
mine, 135 miles from La Paz. The women cradled tommy guns and tucked dynamite caps 
beneath their bulging petticoats. On the floor below, just a bullet's zing through the 
wooden boards should fighting break out, 50 cases of dynamite were stored.56 
 
Domitila arrived at the union building the day after the hostages had been taken captive. 
At this point she was not yet a union leader and had never participated in the committee. She 
came to the union in search of her husband, who had spent the last night on guard duty.57 
Norberta, who was in charge of the hostages, asked Domitila if she would like to help the 
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committee by taking on a shift. Domitila’s husband laughed – she was too lazy and foolish to 
participate. Impressed by the women’s high level or organization and needled by her husband’s 
remark, Domitila volunteered to work all three shifts: the morning, evening and night.58  
  Tensions increased when they heard that indigenous peasant groups from Cochabamba 
were coming to massacre them. At this time peasant militias from the Cochabamba region 
frequently allied themselves with Paz Estenssoro, the current Bolivian president.59 Despite a 
commonality of poverty and the fact that the majority of miners had close familial ties to peasant 
communities, regional, racial, and occupational differences prevented the two groups from 
seeing each other as compañeros in the same struggle until much later on. Facing a potential 
massacre at the hands of the armed peasants, the guards grew more and more anxious. Geroma 
explained, “Inside we became psychologically sick. Every one of us became paler.”60 
   The looming threat of a bloody peasant invasion combined with days upon days of little 
sleep and little food created a very tense and emotional atmosphere.  If the peasants came, what 
would they do? How would they defend themselves? In response to this growing tension, 
Domitila explained how Geroma addressed all of the volunteers: “[She] said the responsibility 
we had taken was a big one, but that she felt happy and that we had to carry out to the end the 
task we’d been given. But we couldn’t leave our children behind to suffer in the hands of those 
people. So our obligation was to die with our children.”61 Domitila continued, “Then we decided 
that all of us, with our children and our husbands, should move into the union building and place 
                                                      
58
 Ibid., 82. 
59
 Lagos, Nos hemos forjado así, 89. 
60
 Ibid., 88. 
61
 Chungara and Viezzer, Let Me Speak!, 84. 
30 
 
 
 
dynamite in such a way that, if necessary, we’d be blown up with the building, but so that no one 
would come out of there alive, not us or them. That was our final decision.”62  
  While the women plotted their last resort escape, overwrought members of the American 
government struggled to lend support to the American hostages. Anxious to see the hostages 
released from the reportedly impulsive “bowler-hatted women”63, President Johnson offered the 
Bolivian government full US military support to liberate the prisoners. Rumor had it that the US 
government wanted to deploy a unit of the Special Forces stationed in Panama and equipped 
with helicopters to the mining center.64   
  Despite the obvious technological advantages of the North American armed forces, the 
Bolivian military refused all levels of North American aid. President Estenssoro feared that 
accepting this help would not only put the hostages at risk, but could also instigate a bloody civil 
war. Instead of allowing American troops to intervene, President Estenssoro sent Vice President 
and labor leader Juan Lechín to Siglo XX. As the national leader for the miners’ union, the 
national government hoped Lechín would be able to persuade the miners to release their 
prisoners. President Estenssoro also ordered 3,000 Bolivian troops to encircle Siglo XX in case 
Lechín failed.65 The President then repeated his earlier message: there would be no exchange of 
prisoners but that the prisoners must be freed.66  
As the tensions between the miners and the national government continued to climb, 
Lechín tried to convince the women that they had to release the hostages before their leaders 
returned to avoid a bloody massacre. The women refused. Geroma told him: 
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But what about our compañeros? They must be being tortured, they’re prisoners too. We 
know what torturers like San Román and Señor Menacho are like… Señor Lechín, we 
have been here on guard duty for many nights, without sleeping, without eating, and 
without a lot of help. But that doesn’t matter, we’re going to keep going and we’re not 
letting them go.67   
  
  The Bishop of La Paz also came to talk to the women and he too grew angry when the 
women refused to concede the prisoners. Domitila explained, “I can see that he didn’t understand 
why we did it, that it was the final resort in the terrible situation in which we lived – you 
know?”68 
  Furious at their stubbornness, Lechín returned to La Paz and had their imprisoned leaders 
write to the women. Escobar and Pimental urged the miners to release the foreign prisoners.69 
Worried that letters were inauthentic (they suspected that their leaders were tortured into signing 
those documents), the women again denied his request. However, these letters did convince 
miners from Siglo XX to hold an assembly to discuss their options. Lechín spoke to this 
assembly. He described how 3,000 troops and dozens of tanks were moving toward Siglo XX. 
Convinced that failing to release the prisoners would lead only to bloodshed and possibly 
realizing that this experience would also result in bad press for their cause,70 the assembly voted 
to free the hostages. They reported the outcome of the assembly to the women, and the women 
submitted to the union’s vote. The women returned to their homes feeling frustrated that the 
assembly had given into the threats of the government and that their own opinion had not been 
taken into account in the assembly vote.  
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  Despite a sense of failure, many women still felt like they had accomplished something. 
Domitila discussed her personal growth during this physically and emotionally trying 
experience: “What I saw and lived during those events, in all those days we spent in the union 
buildings with the hostages, will help me all my life. And from that experience on I began to 
participate regularly in the Housewives’ Committee.”71  
 
The Housewives’ Committee’s participation in this extremely dangerous bargaining 
attempt demonstrates women’s willingness to support the miner’s union in whatever way they 
could. Housewives’ Committee leader Norberta’s decision to volunteer the committee to watch 
over the hostages was especially courageous because at this time the North American 
government was beginning to acquire an infamous reputation for invading left-leaning 
countries.72 Their refusal to give in also demonstrated their intense commitment to their 
community. After hearing rumors that peasant militias planned to invade, the women did not 
give in. When Lechín announced that 3,000 members of the national armed forces were coming 
to surround their community the women again decided that they would continue to guard the 
prisoners. By the end, the women even concluded that they would rather sacrifice their own lives 
and those of their families than let down the union leaders who were imprisoned. 
Domitila’s discovery of her own activism also illustrates a national phenomenon that was 
taking place in mining centers across Bolivia. In this incident, Domitila overcame internalized 
notions that she ought not to participate in politics after being encouraged by Norberta. This 
encouragement enabled her to shake off her husband’s taunts by offering to work all three shifts. 
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After deciding to participate for the first time, she discovered a passion for helping her 
community end its suffering through politics. Similarly, across the country women from mining 
centers were turning to political activism for the first time. Shortly after 1961, women from the 
mining centers Animas, Seite Suyos, Santa Ana, Buen Retiro, Tasna, Rosari, Tatasi, and 
Telemayo all created their own Housewives’ Committees.  
Women also quickly began to develop plans to form a national committee that would link 
these committees to strengthen their activism. Miners’ unions did not believe that there was any 
need for a national structure, and women agreed to put these ideas on hold for the sake of their 
relationship with the male miners’ union. In the interim, women still leaned on this growing 
network for support of their own political demonstrations.  In August of 1963 women of the 
Housewives’ Committee of Siglo XX wrote a letter asking women from mining centers across 
Bolivia to send funds and goods – especially foodstuffs – to support the families of the women 
who were striking.73  Women from all of the aforementioned committees responded to their call 
through by sending goods or written support.74 One woman, Manuela de Sejas, died from 
complications that arose after participating in the strike. Her martyrdom inspired many more 
women to join the cause.75 
A declaration released on the 27th of November, 1963 by the Housewives’ Committee of 
Siglo XX and sent out to mining centers across Bolivia illuminated how much women’s activism 
had changed since the first strike of 1961. It read: “As housewives we are obligated to contest 
reactionary governments bought by foreign governments that want to exploit us. We are 
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obligated to unite ourselves to ask the government to respect women and children.”76 In just two 
short years, women had already grown from unsure to convinced that women’s proper role in 
politics was an active one. 
 
VI. Their Decision to Act 
Mining women’s decision to create one of the first female groups is surprising 
considering the deeply gendered nature of Bolivian mining society. In mining centers, like in 
most of Bolivian society, women and men’s roles were very distinct. Women were not allowed 
to enter the mines because it was believed that a woman’s presence would upset the Tío, the 
deity that could either protect or end the life of a miner. Instead of working in the mines, women 
were responsible for typical domestic tasks, including taking care of the household and raising 
the children. Mine workers’ extremely low wages also necessitated that women work outside of 
the mines in the informal economy.  
Despite the intense labor that women had to perform for the survival of their families, (a 
topic that will be further explored in the following chapter), women’s work was considered 
inferior to men’s, and they were consequently excluded from working class politics. Believing 
that politics was outside of women’s normal sphere, women were instead taught to focus solely 
on their household. Domitila explained how these pervasive social norms caused women to feel 
that they were incapable of speaking up in politics: 
To begin with, no one really accepted the importance of a women’s organization, for in 
Bolivia we are accustomed to women not participating. Women are regarded as 
inferior beings, incapable of taking responsibilities. Actually, we as women 
underestimated our own capacity, but the stronger compañeras were firm in their decision 
to make themselves known as human beings capable of achieving something.77 
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Justina, who was quite young when the committee was founded, remembered hearing 
how difficult it was for women to join the committee in its early years because of this patriarchal 
nature of Bolivian society. She recalled: “There was a lot of machismo. I was young, but I 
remember the older leaders would say: ‘We did not enter easily. Joining the Housewives’ 
Committee was dangerous. We often came with bruised eyes to the Housewives’ Committee 
meetings.”78 Norma, the first leader of the committee in Siglo XX, confirmed this reality. She 
explained: “A lot of women never participated in the committee because of the questioning of 
their husbands. For this reason, to be a leader, the first battle was in our homes…. In my house 
my husband and I were polar opposites. For this reason being a leader caused me a lot of 
suffering.” She continued,  “Many women didn’t join the committee out of fear of their husbands 
and other things, including criticisms from one woman to another. When I became a leader, my 
godparents stopped sending me invitations to things.”79 Emiliana’s experience in Huanuni 
confirmed that patriarchy was pervasive in mining centers across Bolivia. She explained, “The 
discrimination was huge. Workers wouldn’t let us go to their hearings; they threw us out or they 
wouldn’t let us enter. They always discriminated against us.”80 Zenobia, another leader from 
Huanuni, agreed. She remembered, “They would say to us, Women! To the kitchen. Go home. 
Go home and cook.”81  
Given the prominence of patriarchal ideas in mining culture, it seems unusual that such 
radical changes regarding women’s role in society developed in mining centers. This paradox 
can be explained by first looking at the highly politicized nature of the mining centers. Geroma, 
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an activist from Siglo XX, discussed how her father’s long-term persecution by the national 
government led her to enter politics.  “I was born in the house of a worker and I saw how my 
father was persecuted his entire life, from 1942 until 1952. This is what motivated me to join the 
women’s movement in the mines.”82 Domitila explained how watching their workers fight for 
the greater community made her feel that she too had an obligation to act. She reflected: “The 
mine workers’ wives organized a committee in Siglo XX during that very difficult period of Paz 
Estenssoro. Seeing all the struggles the people were involved in, they couldn’t stay on the 
sidelines… Necessity made us organize.”83  
  Domitila’s explanation also alludes to another important reason that women entered 
politics: the constant lack of basic necessities. The testimony of Geroma emphasizes the 
importance of the lack of basic goods in women’s decision to enter politics. She explained: 
“Without doubt, housewives were the most affected by the hunger politics of the government [of 
the early 1960s]. Little by little women became conscious of this fact.”84  Miram Rojas, a woman 
from the mining center Cami, confirmed that the wide suffering of her community, and more 
specifically the suffering of children due to the lack of basic foodstuffs motivated women from 
her mining district to organize into a committee. She explained, “We joined so that women 
would have a voice and fight against the hunger of our children. To satiate the hunger of our 
children. Because during this period our children were dying from hunger.”85  
Lastly, women’s position as wives to the exploited miner marked another crucial reason 
to enter politics. During this time period, miners worked eight hour shifts, sometimes in the 
morning, in the afternoon, or at night. On these shifts men were not allowed to bring in food. To 
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keep away the hunger they ate coca leaves, an Andean stimulant, or drank tea made out of the 
leaf. Once inside the mine, workers performed physically exhausting work in poisonous 
conditions. All miners eventually developed the lung disease silicosis, caused by inhaling 
particles. This disease, combined with frequent accidents, caused the average life expectancy of a 
miner to be about 35.86  
Despite the incredibly difficult nature of this work, miners received very little in return 
for their labor. Miners who had enough points (points were given based on years worked and 
family size) lived in company housing, which was made up of a small one or two-roomed shack. 
Families who lived in these houses shared a bathroom, got all of their water from a shared pump 
and had limited electricity. These houses were also not given to mining families but loaned: after 
a worker died, his family had 90 days to relocate. Despite the incredible unfairness between what 
a worker gave (his physical health) and what a worker received (horrendous living conditions), 
the government denied that the miner was exploited. Domitila explained: 
Of course, government propaganda makes it seem that we lead an easy life, and when 
they speak of the miners they even say we get free housing, free drinking water, free 
electricity, free education, cheap groceries, and other things. But let anyone who wants to 
come to Siglo XX and they’ll be able to see reality for themselves.  
 
Gumercinda, a leader from Siglo XX, in her testimony confirmed this reality. She explained, 
“The miners don’t get anything for free. They give. For us they destroy their lungs.” 
Julia from Siglo XX articulated how women’s recognition of their husband’s struggle 
was enormously important in women’s decision to become activists. Her justification also 
suggests that women’s decision to call themselves the “Housewives’ Committee” stemmed from 
the deep empathy and respect they felt for mine workers. She explained:  
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The true housewives were the women miners who on a daily basis stood beside their 
husbands and saw how some miners entered the mine with a little bit of coca and tea. 
This housewife knew how to value the miner, knew how to value the sacrifice of this 
worker. This housewife had the right to fight beside the worker. These women, in my 
opinion, are true housewives.87 
 
VII: Mothers not Extremists Awoke to New Political Responsibilities 
Even though patriarchy was a very real concern for women who wanted to join the 
movement during this period, reviewing the testimonies of the women who participated 
demonstrates that women’s real success in breaking into the public world of politics was not 
defined by their ability to overcome the prejudices placed upon them by men. Rather, women’s 
entrance into politics was the product of their personal transformation: in a very short time 
period, mining women across the country went from feeling like they were not capable of 
participating in politics to believing that they had no choice but to develop their skills as 
activists: as good wives and mothers in a world where human rights abuses were commonplace 
and basic necessities were lacking, activism was their only choice. Domitila explained this 
transformative realization: 
There was quite a lot of opposition from our husbands when we started the committee in 
June 1961. To begin with, no one really accepted the importance of a women’s 
organization, for in Bolivia we are accustomed to women not participating. Women are 
regarded as inferior beings, incapable of taking responsibilities. Actually, we as women 
underestimated our own capacity, but the stronger compañeras were firm in their decision 
to make themselves known as human beings capable of achieving something. So, they 
persevered and now we have a situation where the women’s organization is 
indispensable. 88 
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As her quotation expresses, once they began to feel a personal responsibility to advocate for their 
communities, neither taunting or prejudices could stop them.  
Looking at their initial reasons for founding the committee demonstrates the unfairness of 
contemporary rightist discourse. This discourse claimed that these women were brainwashed by 
communist agents like labor leader Lechín (a self-identified Trotskyite Communist).89 Domitila 
commented directly on the accusation that women miners’ activism was based on communist 
ideology: 
In my case, when they beat me in the [prison] cells because I was a “communist” and an 
“extremist” and all that, they awoke a curiosity in me. “What is communism? What is 
socialism?”… And then I began to analyze, “What have I done? What do I want? What 
do I think? I only asked for justice for the people, I only asked that everyone has enough 
to eat, I asked for education to be better. I asked that there be no more massacres like the 
terrible San Juan Massacre.90 Is that socialism? Is that communism?91 
 
Domitila’s reflections, like the testimonies above, prove that women’s activism came from their 
position as mothers of hungry children and as wives of husbands who died young from unsafe 
work, not because they were manipulated by radicals. Elena, an activist from Siglo XX, 
confirmed that women did not become activists after being brainwashed by political zealots. She 
vented her frustrations against these types of inaccuracies. She commented, “People already 
don’t know why we went out to fight – it was because there wasn’t any bread in the house. 
Everyone needs to know that. In the universities they have to read about this.”92  
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Chapter 2: Mining Women’s Political Development Under Fire (1964 – 1978) 
 
II. Women’s Activism When Military Dictatorships Controlled Bolivia 
During the next period of Bolivian history, members of the Housewives’ Committee 
remained conscious of their responsibility to defend their communities from economic 
exploitation and political abuse. This was a tall order considering the violent nature of this 
period: in 1964, a military coup led by General Barrientos ended the revolutionary period and 
plunged the nation into a period of military dictatorships that lasted until 1978. The military 
governments that rose and fell during this period were among the most anti-labor in recent 
Bolivian history. Housewives’ Committee leader Emiliana explained, “Every time there as a 
coup - whether it be Barrientos [1964], Banzer [1971] or Garcia Mesa [1980] - upon gaining 
power every government immediately militarized the mining centers.”1 In addition to sending 
troops to all mining centers, Bolivia’s military governments also resorted to numerous other 
coercive tactics to control organized labor and other leftist’s sympathizers. Some such tactics 
included curfews, the illegalization of unions, torture, forced disappearances, and even 
massacres, (all tactics similar to those employed in other Southern Cone countries).2  
Against this backdrop of confrontation and conflict, members of the Housewives’ 
Committee continued to devote themselves to the working class’ struggle. For the most part, 
mining women’s political activism focused primarily on building a partnership with the FSTMB: 
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in their efforts to support the national miners’ union, women performed a wide variety of tasks 
depending on the union’s needs. At different times, women defended union leaders who had 
been arrested, sent petitions and other documents to the government and COMIBOL and vocally 
protested the executive branch of the mining company. They also publically pressured the 
government and the mining company by performing hunger strikes, demonstrations, protests, 
marches, and engaging in street confrontations with the army or male strikebreakers.3 Their 
willingness to take on a wide range of roles and their clear commitment enabled them to win 
more and more respect and responsibility within the miners’ union structure. 
Their continued broad participation in politics had profound effects on the women who 
participated as it had during the end of the revolutionary period. Through spending significant 
time working with other women, members of the Housewives’ Committee began to recognize 
the importance of their paid and unpaid labor in the mining labor economy. These new 
realizations expanded the scope of women’s activism to include projects that were more directly 
relevant to women: in addition to building a partnership with the male miners’ unions’ initiatives 
and goals, women also began to advocate for a number of women’s issues including lobbying for 
better employment opportunities for women and calling attention to the number of neglected 
orphan girls in their communities.  
 
II. Military Coups and Repression of Miners and Their Families (1964-1978) 
   General Barrientos’ rise to power in 1964 set precedence for a number of upcoming 
military coups. To put this decade-and-a-half in perspective, it is important to note that since 
Bolivia became an independent nation in 1825, it has experienced eighteen coups. Fourteen out 
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of those eighteen occurred between 1964 and 1982.4 While the number of coups Bolivia 
experienced during this period was unusual, the country’s shift away from democracy followed 
regional trends: by the 1970s, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay had installed 
military dictators.5 As in the case of these other Southern Cone countries, the Bolivian 
government immediately sought to control organized labor.6 In the Bolivian case, this meant 
muzzling the mining centers.  
The Barrientos regime controlled Bolivia from 1964 – 1969. During this time period, the 
government frequently resorted to extreme violence to quell dissent in the mining districts. The 
first massacre took place in September of 1965. The unrest that led to this violent act can be 
traced back to the Barrientos government’s decision to enter stage three of the Triangular Plan in 
May of 1965.7 This meant lowering wages in the mines by up to 40%, firing more than 1,000 
miners, and making all mining union activity illegal.8 The Barrientos government took this next 
step because international investors threatened to cut funds unless notable ‘progress’ was made 
in the mining centers.9 
   Immediately after these changes were announced, miners across the country reacted 
with anger. Miners blew up bridges, took technical workers hostage, and set off dynamite in 
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mining centers across the country.10 This resistance was met with further repressive policies. On 
June 1, 1965 the COB was abolished.11 Barrientos’ government also sent troops to Siglo XX on 
September 18th and 20th to try and capture underground union leaders. 12   
     Gilia de Caceres, wife of a union activist, described her encounter with the Bolivian troops 
when they came searching for her husband. When the soldiers threatened to shoot down the door, 
she responded: “‘If you shoot, I won’t open. I’m only with my children.’ Then, on the count of 
three I opened the door and just as I opened the door they began to shoot from a very close 
distance. We all jumped backwards and luckily the bullets passed by me.”13 Other families were 
not as lucky. Domitila remembered how sometimes entire families were murdered during the 
military’s search for union leaders.14 
      After knowledge of these types of encounters spread, the underground miners’ union in 
Siglo XX began to organize an armed resistance to expel the army from the community. This 
prompted many violent clashes between the armed forces and the miners including an all-out 
attack on mining centers on September 20th.15 Domitila described the experience:  
The bullets came towards us from everywhere, like rays of light. And not only that, but 
they also attacked the ambulances, something that can’t be accepted in any war, in any 
battle; it’s an international crime, isn’t it? There were many dead and there were so many 
wounded that they didn’t fit into the Cataví hospital.16   
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Anywhere between 25 and 200 people were killed, the majority of whom were workers and their 
families. Another 85 people were wounded.17,18 
     After the massacre, Siglo XX was declared a military zone. A curfew was instated; after 8 
pm, no one, not even children, could leave for any reason, not even to go to the communal 
bathroom, without being escorted by a soldier.19  
       The second large massacre of the Barrientos period occurred in June of 1967. During this 
time, Ernesto “Che” Guevara was in the process of building a guerilla force in the mountains of 
Bolivia. Little contact was made between Che’s guerillas and the miners, although many miners 
were sympathetic to his cause.20 In June of 1967, nearly a year after Che had arrived in Bolivia, 
miners across Bolivia planned to hold a meeting to address Che’s ideology and generate funds 
for Che’s guerillas. At this meeting, the miners also intended to develop a plan to demand pre-
May 1965 wages, the reinstatement of fired workers, and the return of the exiled labor organizers 
and leaders.21 The meeting was to take place on June 25th, the night after San Juan. (San Juan is a 
traditional holiday in mining centers where the whole community celebrates the shortest day of 
the year by feasting, singing, dancing, and drinking in front of bonfires until late into the night.) 
 Before the meeting could take place, however, the government caught wind of their 
plans. Recognizing the potential threat this meeting held to its control over the country, the 
national government reacted again with extreme violence. It sent troops to all mining centers, 
destroyed their radios to prevent communication between mining centers and captured union 
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leaders.22 The most dramatic action took place in Siglo XX. There, the government decided to 
attack the community while its members took part in the San Juan festivities. Gumercinda, a 
leader of the Housewives’ Committee from Siglo XX, explained how the army descended into 
the community while they celebrated: 
On the Massacre of San Juan, all of the miners from Siglo XX had the tradition of having 
a bonfire in the Plaza del Minero.23 On this night lots of workers and their families stood 
outside and enjoyed the campfire until 4:30 in the morning. I remember that around that 
time a lot of paramilitaries dressed in green ponchos walked by… And so I asked myself, 
“What are they doing?” At 4:45 the shooting began. And so many people were still by the 
fire. And my dad was taken prisoner…And really, so many people died where I lived. 
Because right where I was they had been building a kindergarten, and that’s where the 
paramilitaries entered. That’s where the bullets came from. With automatic weapons they 
began to shoot at us. And our leaders were taken prisoner. Immediately they took over 
the Voz de Minero [the radio station]. That’s what happened on the night of San Juan.24  
 
The Massacre of San Juan, remembered as La Noche Triste de San Juan or the Sad Night of San 
Juan, shifted the public’s understanding of the power struggle between the two groups. From this 
point onward, miners would be viewed more as the victims and the Barrientos government 
would be seen as the villains in the epic power struggle between the working class and the 
national government.25 
      Even though public opinion aligned itself more with the miners than the government, 
oppression of those who the government deemed as “Che supporters” continued after the 
massacre of San Juan. Domitila explained: 
All of us, who, according to them, had supported the guerillas, were arrested, beaten, 
mistreated and several were killed. For example, I lost my unborn child in prison because 
they kicked me in the stomach. So, many of our comrades and even some of our children 
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went with Che, because many of us have lost some of our most beloved ones for the sake 
of Che’s guerillas in Bolivia.26 
 
Norberta, the first president of the Housewives’ Committee, was also tortured in prison for her 
supposed connection with Che’s guerillas.27 This harassment, along with the mysterious death of 
Federico Escobar, who was an important advisor to the Housewives’ Committee, virtually 
dissolved the committee for the rest of Barrientos’ rule.28 Their surrender, however, was only 
temporary. 
       The Housewives’ Committee Community and the mining centers more broadly 
experienced a temporary reprieve after Barrientos’ sudden death in a helicopter crash in April of 
1969. After the death of General Barrientos, Bolivia experienced three coups in three years. The 
first two governments, led by General Ovando and General Torres respectively greatly relaxed 
the restrictions that had served to gag the labor left during Barrientos’ regime. Housewives’ 
Committee leader Julia discussed Ovando’s positive impact on the working class: “Ovando 
opened up some space. He was more democratic. He allowed those who had been exiled to 
Argentina to come back. He also increased the salaries back to what they had been before 
Barrientos cut them in half and legalized the unions again.”29  
  Despite many changes, General Ovando was also not able to win the support of the miners. 
With the San Juan Massacre still fresh in the minds of FSTMB’s leaders, many working class 
activists viewed General Ovando’s attempts to win their support as unauthentic or at least not to 
be wholly trusted. Domitila, after reorganizing the Housewives’ Committee, wrote: “We cannot 
forget the massacres, the capturing, or the imprisonment of just leaders like Federico Escobar, 
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Rosendo García, César Lora, or Isaac Camacho. Nor can we forget the murder of thousands of 
other workers, women, and children.”30 These types of memories made it impossible for workers 
to fully accept a military man as their leader. As a result, even after Ovando continued to pursue 
populist policies like nationalizing the Gulf Oil Company, the miners offered only their tentative 
support.31 
     Without any true allies, the Ovando government fell on October 7, 1970. Political chaos 
ensued and then calmed when General Torres took control. The military agreed to back him 
because it thought that he was the only one who could hope to win the support of both the labor 
left and represent the interests of the military.32 After assuming control of the nation, General 
Torres continued to pursue policies in favor of the working class. After increasing miners’ 
wages, he traveled to the mines and sought to speak with representatives of the Housewives’ 
Committee. Domitila remembered that she wanted to believe that the military would now work 
with the unions, but could not fully trust the institution. She told General Torres, “If you’re our 
friend, then prove it by arming the people.”33 
     Meanwhile, the National Trade Union Federation (COB) organized a political assembly 
called the Asamblea Popular or Popular Assembly in June of 1970 in order to formulate a set of 
demands to give to the Torres government.34 Peasant groups, labor groups and left wing political 
groups came together to debate the future of the country, but the Housewives’ Committee was 
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not invited to participate.35 This assembly, while very divided, came up with a few demands. 
Like Domitila, they insisted that the government rearm the peasant and worker militias. General 
Torres, a military man, refused to grant them this request.36  
  Ironically, even though the Popular Assembly created very little unity among leftist 
groups, it was very successful in doing so between the military, rightist groups, and the United 
States. The United States believed that the Assembly would undo all of the “progress” it had 
helped initiate with its stipulated aid packages like the Triangular Plan. Similarly, both the 
military and conservatives also believed the Popular Assembly would undo recent economic 
progress and lead to chaos. Consequently, these three groups – the United States, conservative 
civilians who most often came from Santa Cruz, and the military – began to support a coup. This 
enabled General Banzer from Santa Cruz to lead a successful coup in August of 1971. 
Housewives’ Committee leader Elena explained the transition of power: “There they were 
beginning to bring democracy to this country which General Banzer didn’t like. Neither did the 
United States, and we were already the United States’ puppets.”37 Julia, another leader from 
Siglo XX, gave her opinion on the failure of Torres’ government and the Assembly to move the 
country away from military dictatorships. She explained, “I think Torres took too long in arming 
the people. I think he doubted us, because if he had armed us maybe he wouldn’t have been 
overthrown.”38  
  After seizing control, Banzer’s government went on a rampage to crush the power of the 
labor left. The new government’s use of violence differed dramatically from those of the 
Barrientos period. Whereas the Barrientos government wanted only to “discipline” the labor left, 
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Banzer’s government hoped to destroy the backbone of the left and its sympathizers. The 
differences in approach meant that under Barrientos’ regime workers died for the most part in 
direct confrontation with the government, but during Banzer’s rule especially in the months 
following the coup, the government killed, made disappear, or imprisoned miners without any 
provocation. Banzer’s government also targeted the left more broadly instead of just the miners. 
Students in particular became the target of government oppression. These types of oppressive 
strategies were common in countries across the Southern Cone. 
Emiliana from the Housewives’ Committee of Huanuni described the widespread 
oppression during Banzer’s rule: 
Banzer’s coup was accompanied by death, torture, and disappearances. The government 
made lots of people disappear, not only miners. People from the middle class, 
professionals, students, housewives, businessmen, people who worked for oil companies, 
teachers, everyone paid a very high price with the coup of General Banzer.39  
 
  After the initial assault, Banzer’s regime continued to implement many strategies to keep 
the repressive lid on the labor left. The government quickly declared the COB and the FSTMB 
illegal as well as all leftist political parties.40 In 1974 the government issued a decree legalizing 
the de facto ban on all unions. This degree also banned all political parties, including centrist and 
right-leaning ones.41 Borrowing from tactics used in other Southern Cone countries including 
Argentina, the government also created false parallel organizations of both the FSTMB and the 
Housewives’ Committee.42,43  Filled with spies, these government-led committees were designed 
to confuse working class people and enable the government to identify activists.44 
                                                      
39
 Reyes, interview by Raney. 
40
 Klein, A Concise History of Bolivia, 230. 
41
 Malloy and Gamarra, Revolution and Reaction, 91. 
42
 Munck, Authoritarianism and democratization 47. 
50 
 
 
 
  At first, the violence was so great that for a time period the demands of the working class 
were indeed silenced.45 Gradually, though, it became apparent that the government could not 
possibly quell the spirits of the working class indefinitely. Towards the latter half of the 1970s, 
union groups slowly emerged from hiding and began to challenge Banzer’s oppressive control. 
As the government’s control began to wane, the government announced it would hold elections 
in 1978.  
In December of 1977 four women from the mining center Siglo XX took advantage of 
the government’s declining power and began the strike that gained them national recognition. 
With their fourteen children, they publically announced that they would not eat again until the 
government met their four demands: unrestricted amnesty, the reinstatement of fired workers, the 
legalization of union activity, and the removal of troops from the mining centers.46 Their 
commitment to bringing political justice to their communities awoke solidarity among other 
groups who were similarly fed-up with military rule. With no cards left to play, Banzer conceded 
to three of these four demands. Bolivia’s long-term control by military governments had ended.  
The women’s strike was not only important for pushing the government to hold early 
elections: it also put the working class in a powerful position as the nation began its 
democratization process. Rather than seen as radicals, the strike enabled citizens from all social 
classes to see themselves as part of the working class’ struggle for liberty. The women’s role in 
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bringing down the dictatorship, then, was enormously important in building the public’s 
perception of the working class as the nation moved towards democratic rule.   
 
III. The Partnership Between the Housewives’ Committees and the FSTMB 
Examining the military dictatorships of the 60s and 70s demonstrates that they ruthlessly 
went after mining centers – including mining women – when trying to consolidate their control 
over the nation. During the Barrientos government and especially during Banzer’s regime, all 
means of coercion were fair game in their mission to stamp out leftist activism. This backdrop of 
intense struggle and suffering hardly seems the right political landscape for women’s 
incorporation into formal politics. And yet, in Bolivia, this was exactly the setting in which 
women from the Housewives’ Committee came to assert themselves as powerful allies to the 
working class’ political movement. 
When military dictators controlled Bolivia, women from the Housewives’ Committee 
resisted the government’s control primarily through helping miners’ unions in a wide variety of 
tasks. At different times secrecy became an important survival skill of the union, and members of 
the Housewives’ Committee learned how to support the union with its clandestine operations by 
transporting letters or other documents. Other times when the movement came out of hiding, the 
Housewives’ Committee sent petitions and other documents to the government and the company 
and vocally denounced the actions of the government and COMIBOL. They also supported the 
FSTMB by holding their own political demonstrations, or helping miners with their protests by 
supplying food as well as participating in street confrontations with the army and 
52 
 
 
 
strikebreakers.47 Their solidarity prompted the gradual incorporation of women into the 
FSTMB’s meetings and structure.  
Geroma summarized women’s support of the miners’ union’s clandestine efforts: 
 Between 1965 and 1968, us women, especially Alicia [Wife of male union leader Federico 
Escobar, an important mentor to the Housewives’ Committee in Siglo XX] and Marta de Velasquez, 
have participated in a very ferocious struggle, you could say.  A clandestine fight, where 
we didn’t have time to take care of the home, or to serve lunch, or food, because we were 
always traveling somewhere, helping with something or other. The number of times I 
have traveled to Siglo XX in secret! I carried documents from party leaders who wanted 
to help union leaders in Siglo XX. And this documentation I didn’t carry by plane or by 
daylight. I traveled by car, usually by bus, and always by night.48  
 
Emiliana also described how she and other female activists helped the union in whatever ways 
possible while the union operated in secret. On one occasion, she remembered helping to 
disguise a mine union leader as a woman so that he could escape from Huanuni without being 
recognized.49 
  Even though the risk was high, women also on occasion publically participated in the 
shared struggle for better living conditions and liberty in the mines. At different times, the 
Housewives’ Committee became a tool for communicating with the general public about the 
tragedies they endured at great personal risk. For example, even after the massacre of San Juan, 
women activists from the Housewives’ Committee brought attention to the tragic nature of 
military recruitment in the mining centers. In their manifesto to Bolivian mothers and workers, 
members of the Housewives’ Committee discussed the tragedy and hypocrisy of recruiting sons 
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from the working class and the peasantry to serve in the army that was a tool to oppress the 
peasants and the working class.50 Their manifesto read: 
Mothers from the Bolivian mines cannot forget the massacres brought on by the military. 
We will never forget the mourning or the pain that they have caused us. Naturally for this 
reason we worry when we see officials of the military coming to our communities to draft 
young men to turn them into killers of their own mothers and siblings…. They have no 
right to come here and take away our sons and orphans. We will not permit them to come 
back because we did not give birth to our own future murderers.51 
 
Their position as mothers of soldiers enabled them to build a powerful and persuasive argument 
against military recruitment of working class men. It also further called into question the 
morality of the current military regime.  
  Starting with the massacre of 1964, Domitila Chungara also began to establish herself as a 
spokesperson for the Housewives’ Committee and by extension, all women from the Bolivian 
mines. After the massacre of 1965, many people were too terrified to report to the press what had 
happened. Domitila, however, found that she could not stay silent. She explained: 
It drove me crazy that people couldn’t talk, that people couldn’t say anything, even 
though they were drowning in pain and anguish. But they couldn’t talk because everyone 
was afraid, you know? It made me sad, it made me depressed. Speak. Speak! I’d say… 
So I stood up and began to speak. And I denounced everything that happened. I explained 
our whole problem. How we’d wanted them to give us back our wages and how we’d 
asked for them. How the repression was killing us. And I spoke of all the things I’d seen, 
including how I’d seen them attack the ambulances. And I told them the whole world 
must find out about our situation.52 
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Domitila’s willingness to speak up about her people’s oppression brought many members 
of the mining community to begin to respect women’s new role in politics.53 Her frequent public 
denunciations of the national government also got her invited to the International Women’s Year 
Tribunal put on by the United Nations in Mexico in 1975. At this conference, women from all 
over the world voiced their opinions about the problems they encountered as women. 
Recognizing that her problems were fundamentally different from those of women from 
developed nations, Domitila frequently spoke up about the violent repression of her people. Her 
contributions to the tribunal brought international attention to the Housewives’ Committee and to 
the working class’ cause in Bolivia. Domitila’s participation also put her in touch with Moema 
Viezzer, a Brazilian sociologist who interviewed Domitila to create the book Let me Speak!54 
The release of this book brought international interest to the reality of political and economic 
repression in the Bolivian mines. It also increased Domitila’s national and international 
recognition.55 Now under a world spotlight, Domitila’s willingness to put the needs of her 
community above her own gradually won the respect of people throughout the country, including 
the male miners whom they were trying to help. Other mining women, like Domitila, also won 
the respect of their communities through speaking up and then enduring the punishment brought 
on by their resistance. 
   In addition to raising their voices against the injustices their communities faced, women 
of the Bolivian mines also continued to host public political demonstrations in defiance of the 
national government. Two of their largest protests occurred in 1975 and 1976 and were staged in 
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response to two large clashes between the left and the national government: in 1975 the 
government attempted to crack down on the increasingly rebellious mines by closing the church-
run radio stations in Siglo XX (by this time the church had changed sides and become a powerful 
advocate of the left). They also closed San Andres, historically Bolivia’s most politically active 
university in La Paz.56 In reaction to these oppressive maneuvers, women from the Bolivian 
mines traveled to La Paz to help students of San Andres and to protest the oppression of free 
speech in the mining centers.57 This action demonstrated the strong relationship between the left-
leaning student-activists and the women’s movement, as well as women’s courage to openly 
disobey the national government during a period of intense state-led violence.  
The second large clash occurred in 1976. In this instance, women supported the miners’ 
union of Siglo XX in their first serious protest since Banzer’s regime had cracked down on 
activism in 1971. The protest, which took the form of a general strike, challenged the military’s 
decision to shut down radio transmitters in Siglo XX.58,59 Members of the Housewives’ 
Committee in Siglo XX helped the strike by shaming workers who were bribed into going back 
to work before the protest was over.  
In the end, the protest did not push the military out of the mining centers, but it did 
achieve smaller concessions like a minor increase in wages. Importantly, the protest was not 
crushed by the military. As a result, the demonstration was recorded as an organizational victory 
for the miners. It further demonstrated that the military had not managed to stamp out resistance 
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in the mining centers.60 Rather, the military’s oppression backfired: the mining centers were now 
clearly the moral leaders in the power struggle between the working class and the national 
government.  
Women’s widespread publicity as well as their participation in these two events in the 
mid-1970s enabled them to win recognition as the nation’s moral leaders. Women used this new 
position in their indefinite hunger strike in December of 1977. In developing their demands for 
this 21-day-long hunger strike, women leaned heavily on their new position as human rights 
defenders: their demands included a number of basic human rights including the right to 
organize, the right to live in a community without a military presence, the right of exiled leaders 
to return home, and the right of politically targeted miners to return to work.61 The nature of the 
strike itself – a refusal to eat and then a refusal to drink after the government tried to stop their 
strike by using force – further strengthened their cause because it portrayed these women as non-
violent justice-seekers.   
Their carefully crafted hunger strike won the support of the nation. Thousands of 
Bolivians from all different social sectors took the hunger pledge with them, and many others 
demonstrated their allegiance through other means. Amidst so much social unrest, the 
government had no choice but to announce national elections.  
Emiliana reflected on this event: “This was our grand participation of female miners 
within unionism. Until today, female miners, because of them, are recognized.”62 
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IV. Women’s Work and the Reproduction of Labor  
  Women’s diverse political activism during this tumultuous time both changed the miners’ 
union’s view on women’s activism, and led to many personal transformations among the women 
who participated. Women’s willingness to advocate politically for the community in whatever 
capacity was asked of them, and especially their success in1977, slowly won them respect in the 
miners’ union. While machismo by no means died, workers slowly began to incorporate women 
into their assemblies, especially in Siglo XX.63 For example, when the assemblies of workers 
discussed issues that mostly affected women, like the price of food, they began to call on women 
in their assemblies.64  
  Despite these enormous changes, women activists still met some resistance in terms of 
their activism. For example, while the FSTMB tried to help women organize committees in all 
mining centers, they refused to incorporate these committees into the union’s structure. The 
women also could not win enough support to create a national committee.65  
Women’s participation held important personal implications for the women who 
participated. Through spending more time out of the home and in meetings and events with other 
women, Housewives’ Committee members experienced their self-esteem improving, and began 
to perceive both their paid and unpaid work as productive.66All of these changes impacted 
women’s activism: they became more confident leaders and also began to be conscious of the 
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unfairness of women’s subordination. This led women to begin to advocate for issues that were 
more particular to women.67 
After spending significant time organizing together, in the 1970swomen began to 
articulate how their work in and outside the home was crucial to the reproduction of labor in the 
mining centers. 68  Women’s recognition of the importance of their own labor was a novel 
concept, despite the intense amount of labor women had to get done on a daily basis: during the 
time period that the Housewives’ Committee existed, women were still expected to perform the 
invisible work of the home and perform other jobs to supplement their husband’s income, which 
meant that women frequently worked 16-hour days.69 At home, women were in charge of typical 
female tasks including buying and preparing food, sewing clothes and taking care of their usually 
large families. All of these tasks were made especially difficult given their husband’s low 
wages.70  
Surprisingly, women also worked a variety of jobs outside of the household. Some 
women involved themselves in the informal economy through selling coca leafs, a stimulant 
miners used to endure the hard labor underground.71 Others prepared food, or worked as 
laundresses for more wealthy families in nearby cities.72 Still others grew food for their families 
and sold the surplus, though mining centers’ high altitudes made crop yields very low. Some 
women also herded lamas and other livestock, participated in sharecropping with local villages 
or traveled to other villages to buy products to then sell in the mining centers at the local market. 
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Many women also worked directly for the company as high-graders, or pallaris. This job 
entailed searching through discarded mineral piles in search of small pieces of ore. This work 
was typically very physically challenging, and yet women received only a pittance. 
   Children often aided their mothers in these diverse occupations. Boys as young as ten or 
twelve lugged fifty or sixty pound sacks to different parts of the mining site for a very small 
amount of money.73 In very poor families, some young boys entered the mine as workers at very 
young ages. This was especially common if their father died young from an accident or silicosis, 
a lethal lung disease that all miners eventually contracted. 
Women and children worked outside of the home because miners’ low wages were not 
enough for a family to survive.74 For example, a husband’s wage might cover the cost of food, 
but extra income was needed for all other expenses like new clothes or blankets to keep everyone 
warm (the mining centers are notoriously cold due to their location at over 14,000 feet). Given 
the significant disparity between a husband’s wages and a family’s real cost of living, women 
needed to involve themselves in the local economy for their family to get by. The testimony of 
Domitila described a typical day during the mid-20th century. She explained: 
In the mines we women have to get up at 4am to make the breakfast for our compañeros. 
They have to get up at 5am to go to work and when they are in the mine they are not 
allowed to eat - and they work eight-hour shifts. When they come out, they are so tired 
that they don’t even have the strength to eat.  My compañero, who works inside the mine, 
earns $1.50 a day. With eight children that is not enough to live on. So every day I make 
salteñas [spicy empanadas] to sell in the street - to make enough I need the help of all my 
children - from the youngest to the oldest. In my house ten people have to work in order 
for us to survive - and we don’t even own our house, such as it is.75 
 
In Domitila’s autobiography she discusses how she prepared salteñas, every day with her 
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children to supplement her husband’s income. This process was very labor-intensive, but made 
her around  $1.00 a day.76 This work was very labor-intensive and also had significant 
consequences for her children; they could not play or study until the work was done, which cut 
down on their quality of life77. 
Domitila’s experience not only demonstrates the long hours that Domitila put in on a 
daily basis as both a housewife and as a member of the informal economy, but also explains how 
her work and that of her children was instrumental in the success of her immediate family. It is 
likely that most women in Bolivia lived lives similar to, if not more difficult, than Domitila: for 
example, women whose husbands were dead or in exile often had even more responsibilities than 
did Domitila. Brígida, a woman who acted as vice-president of the Housewives’ Committee in 
Siglo XX right after its founding, explained how she came to work the rock pile: “After my 
husband was fired from the mines [for his activism], I had to work the rock piles as a pallaris. I 
worked for 18 years until I became sick from the high pressure and had to move to 
Cochabamba.”78 
   Despite the hard work that all women performed in and outside of the home, women 
were often unaware of how their labor contributed to the economy of labor in their communities. 
This began to change after the creation of the Housewives’ Committee. Domitila discusses 
prejudices that prevented women from finding value in their contributions to society. She 
explained, “At the beginning, we had the mentality that they’d taught us, that women are made 
for the home, to take care of the children and to cook, and that they aren’t capable of assimilating 
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other things.”79 Domitila’s discussion of women’s traditionally low self-esteem reveals that 
mining communities (like most patriarchal societies) gave little value to women’s labor. It also 
demonstrates how members of mining communities overlooked how women were critical actors 
in the mining economy at the time. Women felt that they were not capable of participating in 
activities outside of the private sphere, and yet the majority were already small-scale 
businesswomen.   
  Women’s humble acceptance of these unjust and inaccurate assumptions – namely that 
they were only capable of working in the home – came under fire once extenuating 
circumstances pushed women into politics for the first time. As soon as women began to 
congregate regularly, they realized the hypocritical nature of the argument that women could not 
participate in the labor movement because they were not workers, when clearly they did work 
and this work was important to the survival of the mining family.  
A close examination of the personal transformation of Domitila Chungara provides 
anecdotal evidence of the consciousness-raising described above. In her autobiography, Domitila 
demonstrated how she became aware of how her work – and her children’s work  - was 
important in the reproduction of her husband’s labor. After discussing her long days as a worker, 
she explained:  
I sleep four or five hours a night. We’re used to that. Well, I think that all of this proves 
how the miner is doubly exploited, no? Because, with such a small wage, the woman has 
to do much more in the home… And by exploiting the miner, they don’t only exploit his 
wife too, but there are times that they even exploit his children. Because there’s so much 
work to do in the house that even the little kids have to work; for example, they have to 
get the meat, fetch the water.80  
 
   In an interview with Anabel Yáñez, Domitila discussed how this consciousness-raising 
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of Bolivian women regarding their exploitation and the exploitation of their children was not 
unique to her. Instead, it came about as a collective realization. She explained: 
In the mining centers, the women have begun to realize that the system not only exploits 
the workers in the mines, but also the women who support the miners and also the 
children. While the director of the mining company’s children play, our children have to 
work in order to survive.81  
 
A publication written by the Housewives’ Committee in the mining center San Jose 
confirmed that women were beginning to recognize their important contributions to the system 
of exploitation in mining centers across Bolivia. The document read:  “The Housewives’ 
Committee are here with the goal of protecting the rights of the women and the workers, given 
that they both are part of the current system of exploitation.”82  
As this document suggests, women’s awareness of how their work contributed to the 
economy of their communities enabled them to negotiate space in the broader working class 
movement; whenever workers denied them from participating by claiming that they did not 
work, women knew that this was not the case and could challenge them with clear explanations 
on how their labor propelled the mining community. Evidence of this change can be seen in 
Norma’s explanation of women’s important contributions to the national economy. In a recent 
interview she explained: 
Members of the FSTMB argued that we were the wives of workers and so we should 
always be below them. But I said that yes we were wives of miners, but we were also part 
of the system of production in the mines because without eating, without having someone 
wash their clothes, without having our moral support, our workers could not have moved 
forward. So women have played an important role… she has been an important part of 
the economic development of our country – the female miner.83 
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Women’s new awareness of how their work contributed to the production process also 
made women more aware of their subjugated role in society. This led the Housewives’ 
Committee to broaden their advocacy to include projects that focused specifically on women. For 
example, in Siglo XX the Housewives’ Committee began to advocate for unemployed women. 
Their decision to develop this project stemmed from the fact that during the Barrientos period 
there were an unusually high number of new widows who desperately needed work. Despite the 
great need, there were no jobs for these women. The committee wrote about the current crisis, 
“In our community there are many single women with children… The majority of these women 
and their children spend entire days without a single cup of tea or piece of bread.” 84 
   In light of this situation, the committee developed two projects to provide more women 
with the opportunity to work. First, the committee asked for sewing machines to provide women 
with the opportunity to work. Eventually, the government donated a few sewing machines, 
allowing some unemployed women to form a cooperative. However, the number of women was 
relatively small.85  
   Secondly, the Committee developed a subcommittee for the unemployed.86This 
committee had two main goals. The first was to make sure that women who were most desperate 
for work received work. After the massacres and mass imprisonment of union workers, many 
women in Siglo XX found themselves with seven or eight children and no source of income. The 
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committee organized these women, and met with COMIBOL management to discuss job 
opportunities for women.87  
   After a great deal of arguing, women from this subcommittee convinced the managers 
to listen to them, and the government hired over a hundred women to work the rock pile. This 
work was very physically difficult as well as degrading. Domitila explained, “Every day [the 
women] would get home really bruised with their hands very sore. Because they had to do 
everything by hand; collect the ore, sort it, put it in bags. Absolutely everything by hand.”88 
However, their reward at the end of the month, a substantial paycheck, made it more than worth 
it. The next month another five hundred women went to COMIBOL to ask for work. The 
company hired more women, but the wages dropped significantly.89 
   The second main goal of the Committee for the Unemployed was to secure more rights 
for women workers. Specifically, the subcommittee campaigned to have women given the same 
benefits as male company workers. This meant minimal security benefits, grocery discounts, 
access to medical services and more. Many women who had been working the rock pile for years 
still did not have any of these rights, and the committee worked to ensure that all workers – 
veterans and new workers – received these benefits after a three month trial period. After a great 
deal of advocacy work, women managed to win some rights for female workers including 
medical benefits. Their children were also given permission to attend the company school.90  
   The Housewives’ Committee’s support for working women continued on into the next 
decade. In September of 1970, the committee began a campaign in defense of women who 
worked the rock pile for miserable wages. They wrote that the work of the 200 women who 
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worked on the rock pile “denigrated the dignity of Bolivian women and human rights.”91 Given 
these horrific conditions they claimed, “No mother, child, or woman from any mining center can 
be indifferent to this cause.”92 Their campaign was meant to bring attention to this “national 
shame.”93 However, this strategy backfired. Rather than improving the working conditions of the 
women workers, COMIBOL decided to fire all women who worked in the rock pile. Domitila 
commented on the firings:  
The conditions of [women who worked the rock pile] really constituted a national shame. 
But it is also a shame for Bolivia to not have work for women, isn’t it? Especially for the 
widows of workers who’ve died or been deported by the company, who live in misery 
because they can’t find work – isn’t it?94 
 
The fact that the Housewives’ Committee was deeply concerned with the situation of widows for 
the long-term demonstrates that the committee did not exist solely to serve as an ally for the male 
workers’ union. Rather, women in the committee, in addition to identifying deeply with the work 
of men from the mining centers, also developed an awareness of the important challenges that 
women in their community faced.  
   Further proof of the committee’s interest in addressing women-specific issues shines 
through when examining the committee’s advocacy for orphaned girls. After the massacres of 
the Barrientos period, many children were left homeless. The vulnerability of orphaned girls 
greatly upset the Housewives’ Committee. To help these girls, women wrote letters to the 
company begging for the establishment of an orphanage. A call to action written in March of 
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1965 called on “women’s workers’ civic and sport organizations to announce their support for a 
girl’s orphanage.”95  
   Mining women’s concern for homeless and impoverished girls demonstrates a form of 
solidarity along the lines of gender. However, whenever tensions between the military and the 
mining communities escalated, which was quite frequent during this period, women’s issues 
were often put on hold so the women could focus more on building a partnership with the 
FSTMB. After the 1970s the subcommittee for the unemployed virtually stopped all action and 
their demands for a girl’s orphanage faded away. This shows that women willingly accepted the 
subordination of their own issues for the sake of class unity and the broader working class 
struggle.  
 
 
VI. The Housewives’ Committee and Feminism 
    Women’s new awareness of their oppression made women more aware of their second-
class status, but was ultimately overlooked so that the women could prioritize issues that affected 
the entire community. The prioritization of class issues over women’s issues in the eyes of the 
mining women differentiated their movement from other feminist96 organizations. Domitila 
reflected on what she understood as the differences between the mission of western feminism 
and the goals of the Housewives’ Committee in Bolivia. She explained, I know that there is 
patriarchy – a machismo as we call it – that we do not accept. We have to fight against it. But for 
us there is another fight which is more important.” In another interview, she further articulated 
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key differences between the goals of the Housewives’ Committee and the feminist movement: 
"The main task isn't to fight against our compañeros but with them to change the system in which 
we live for another one – one in which men and women have the right to live, to work and to 
organize.” 97 Domitila’s decision to distinguish mining women makes sense given their living 
conditions: in a world where there was never enough to eat, where the military could come in at 
any moment to take away a worker and husband and thus threaten an entire family’s livelihood, 
women believed that solidarity between the worker and the housewife needed to be the priority. 
Using this ideology, mining women conceded some of their own projects in the hopes of 
protecting class unity. They reasoned that once they overthrew the bourgeois government, these 
issues would be addressed.  Women’s implicit subjugation of women’s goals, as well as their 
rejection of feminism, would come under question during the next stage of the Housewives’ 
Committee’s development. 
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Chapter 3: The Housewives’ Committee and Bolivian Democracy 
 
I. The Return to Democracy and the Closing of Mining Centers across Bolivia 
Now experienced political actors in a wide variety of roles, women of the Housewives’ 
Committee fought ferociously for their communities during Bolivia’s chaotic return to 
democracy. After the fall of Banzer, political parties multiplied as different interest groups 
sought to win control over the country. This lurching process resulted in another coup in 1980, 
and the following two-year regime remains the most notorious in Bolivian history. During this 
extremely oppressive period, women from the mining communities again fought to bring 
democracy back to Bolivia. In 1982, civilians regained control of the government, but again the 
democratic government did not meet the expectations of the mining centers.  Over the next three 
years, the working class tried to reshape the left-leaning democratic government into a socialist 
one, but the government eschewed their goals as unrealistic. Anxious to be more involved in the 
political process, women built a nationwide political organization. This had been one of the goals 
of the movement since its birth. Before women could tap into the power of the national 
Housewives’ Committee, a new more conservative government came to power and their plans 
came to an abrupt halt.  
This new government, led by Paz Estenssoro, embraced neoliberal policies promoted by 
North American economists, the World Bank, and the IMF. After taking office, this new 
leadership immediately set out to implement this economic philosophy known today as “shock 
therapy.” Shortly after assuming office, the government issued a decree that severely threatened 
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the futures of mining centers across Bolivia. Known as 21060, this decree would close 
government-owned mines and lead to the firing of nearly all national mine company workers 
within the next several years. Recognizing that if this decree were implemented they would lose 
their home and source of income, women from the mining centers drew on all of their courage 
and political knowledge to prevent its implementation. Nothing was successful.  
Now unemployed and homeless, miners and their families left the mining centers in 
droves for different cities across Bolivia.  This displacement caused the Housewives’ Committee 
to quickly lose all of its support and power. The abrupt ending of their community activism was 
made more tragic by the difficult conditions that mining families encountered in the cities that 
they moved to. Few miners could find work, which left many more families even more distressed 
than they had been during all of the different dictatorships. 
Despite this sad ending, mining women’s legacy did not die out after the implementation 
of 21060. Rather, because of their activism, by the late 1980s, Bolivian political culture was 
much more accepting of working class women’s participation in politics. This must be 
interpreted as an important victory of the women miners’ political movement. 
 
II. Constructing Democracy after Banzer 
After the critical strike of 1977 and Bolivia’s subsequent return to democracy, Bolivians 
struggled to undo the political and economic havoc that Banzer’s dictatorship had unleashed. 
Banzer’s seven-year rule eroded Bolivian politics to such an extent that when the military set out 
to organize democratic elections in 1978, there were over 50 political parties. This meant that the 
parties were not ideologically based but based on individual’s and group’s personal relationships 
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with political leadership.1 Not surprisingly given these conditions, candidates struggled to gain 
enough support to win the elections. This led to political chaos as groups struggled to use non-
democratic means to assert their power over others. Unsure of which political parties really 
represented the ideals of the working class, the mining centers were unable to build up enough 
support for any one party. 
Against this backdrop of political confusion, over the next four years Bolivia held a 
number of fraudulent elections followed by military coups. Domitila gave her perspective on the 
failure of the working class to come together with a coherent set of goals after the fall of Banzer:   
Thus began a stage of pseudo-democracy. We call it that because although it is true that 
some leaders were set free, and others returned from exile, the repressive organizations, 
the paramilitary groups, the army, continued to operate in the same way. From the 
beginning of 1978, the people began to reorganize their trade unions, their political 
parties, and elections were held. Three elections were held in 1978, 1979 and 1980 and 
each one was brought down by a coup d’état. With each election and each coup the 
people were more divided, and more and more parties developed. In the last elections, in 
1980, there were more than fifty political parties.2 
 
While this political showdown took center stage, the accruing debts and other economic 
problems brought on by Banzer’s regime were ignored.3 By the late 1970s the state was 
accounting for 70 percent of the Bolivian economy, but the state no longer had the natural 
resources to maintain its large role: with staggering debt and little tin left in the mines, the 
government could no longer afford to have such a big role in Bolivian economic development. 
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Despite this reality, the national government lacked the authority to implement austerity 
programs, and so the debt grew.4 
While both the right and the left failed to consolidate power and the national economy 
continued to worsen, it became more and more likely that Bolivia would soon come under the 
control of a right-wing military regime similar to those of neighboring Argentina and Brazil.5 
The political disorder and economic turmoil resulted in a shortage of foodstuffs, which further 
increased the likelihood of a military coup. As predicted, in July of 1980 Bolivia’s lurching 
process towards democracy came to a halt with the coup of General Garcia Mesa. This coup 
brought with it a wave of violent acts and repression, quite unlike that of Barrientos or even 
Banzer. Rather than help solve the current political and economic crisis, this short-lived regime 
brought a heightened level of human rights abuses and continued political agitation.6 It also did 
virtually nothing to address the nation’s plummeting economy, unlike in the case of Chile, 
Argentina, and Brazil.7 
  One telling example of the new regime’s willingness to use terrorism occurred in the 
private mine Caracoles during Garcia’s Meza’s rise to power. In an interview with Jane 
McIntosh, Domitila discussed this event: 
The army stormed the encampment and massacred more than 900 people. They got hold 
of the young men and beat them with ropes; they made them swallow dust. They put 
broken glass down on the ground and made children lie down on top of it.  Then they 
made the mothers trample on top of their children. That must be the greatest crime - to 
make a mother do something like that to her own child.  
Not content with that, the soldiers themselves trampled on top of the children. Women 
and girls were raped and many died from hemorrhages. They put dynamite into the 
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mouth of one of the miners’ leaders and set it off in the middle of the square. And those 
people who wanted to find the bodies of their dead relatives were forbidden to go and 
look for them; many of them were also killed. When the army eventually left Caracoles 
and the people were able to go back and look for their relatives, all they found were a few 
blood-stained pieces of clothing - there was not a single sign of a corpse.8 
 
As stories such as these hurtled from one mining center to the next, members of the 
Housewives’ Committee in Siglo XX developed strategies for resistance. At this time, the 
Housewives’ Committee in Siglo XX was somewhat disorganized in part because Domitila was 
abroad trying to earn economic and political support for her people. In the absence of this 
important female leader, Elena Vidal de Enriquez assumed a leadership role; knowing that their 
community had little time to prepare themselves against the impending militarization of their 
community, she helped create the Committee for the Defense of Democracy in Siglo XX. This 
committee worked closely with the male miners’ union to help the community prepare for an 
attack. Together they set up round the clock guard duty, worked with neighboring peasants to 
create roadblocks, prepared food for the community, and helped build trenches. As the men 
prepared themselves for war, the woman brought them coca leaves, and coffee to keep them 
vigilant. Women also painted the following mural: “Soldier: We are your mother and brothers. 
Don’t become their assassin. Soldier: Use your firearm against the people’s executioner.”9 Elena 
commented on the community’s impressive display of solidarity and resistance: “It was a 
mobilization that the working class should never forget, what we did when Garcia Mesa came to 
power.”10  
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After days of preparation and waiting, the military led an airstrike against Siglo XX. Julia 
described how there were so many bullets and flares that the night became day.11 With only 
dynamite and far-outdated rifles to defend themselves, the people of Siglo XX eventually 
submitted to the rule of Garcia Mesa. Mining centers across Bolivia were forced to do the same.  
   Following the coup began the most brutal and corrupt regime in recent Bolivian 
history.12 This government lacked an economic plan or political ideology but succeeded in 
intimidating the entire society.  Arbitrary arrests, disappearances and torture of people from all 
socioeconomic classes became the reckless government’s main methods of social control.13  A 
bloody example of the regime’s implementation of these tactics against members of the middle 
class occurred on January 15, 1981 when the government assassinated nine members of the 
political group MIR while they met to discuss politics. This incident shocked the middle class. 
Aversion to the new regime intensified when Garcia Meza’s strong ties to the cocaine trade 
came to light.14  
Garcia Meza’s scare tactics created a national paranoia, especially for citizens who 
resisted. Norma from Siglo XX described her own anxieties as well as how she learned to cope 
with the looming threat of state-led terror: 
Garcia Meza’s coup caused a lot of injustice, pain and also daily trauma. During these 
times for example, whenever I saw a military man I would tremble. I would think that 
there was going to be another attack. That’s how I felt. But after a while you become a 
little stronger. You learn to fight until the end. And so later when we did our marches, we 
didn’t have so much fear.15  
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Her reflections on political activism during the reign of Garcia Mesa demonstrate that despite the 
pain of these experiences, they served her political development. Through living in such a tense 
atmosphere, she learned how to look fear in the eye and continue to protest. 
 The psychological impact that this paranoia had on mining children also compelled 
women to be better activists during Garcia Meza’s regime. Believing that the military could enter 
the mining centers at any moment, many children of the mines became too anxious to go to 
school or to class. Elena explained how watching her children struggle with the state’s terror 
tactics helped her overcome her own fear and made her into a better leader: 
I felt enraged because I had to keep going and coming from the mines, which hurt my 
children psychologically. And I said: ‘Why is the military coming to make our husbands 
work with a gun pointed at the nape of their neck?... I was crying… I had to calm down. 
Afterwards I became strong and said to my compañeras: ‘Let’s organize.’16  
 
Elena’s experience suggests that mining women’s position as mothers gave them strength to 
participate politically even when resistance often led to imprisonment and suffering. Unwilling 
to watch their children suffer, many women like Elena found the strength to continue to organize 
even when the stakes were high.  
As women built up their courage, they began to reemploy strategies that they had used 
during other military dictatorships to secretly resist the military regime. An examination of the 
personal experiences of Emiliana, a woman from Huanuni, shows how the intense suffering 
inflicted by Garcia Meza’s government made her a stronger and braver advocate for the working 
class. She recounted her struggle, development, and resistance during this difficult time:  
[After the coup of Garcia Mesa] they exiled my husband. It was a difficult time with a lot 
of suffering because there wasn’t anyone to provide us with food, anyone who could 
work for us. So I began to work selling fruit in the market so I would have food for my 
children. We survived the period of Garcia Mesa. But we also continued to unite, us 
                                                      
16
 Lagos, Nos hemos forjado así, 141. 
75 
 
 
 
women. We kept participating, speaking, fighting, even if they put a gun to our heads. 
For example, I brought bananas from Oruro [a nearby city] and hidden in between the 
bananas I brought manifestos. Because I went between Huanuni and Oruro with the 
permission of the police. And I arrived with those manifestos at three in the morning and 
I went up to the mine’s entrance. I went up almost to the top… There’s an opening that 
goes way down deep into the mine, like a chimney. From there I dropped the pamphlets. 
And the next day the miners would have their manifestos, their pamphlets. I did this 
because we had to continue resisting. We had to resist Garcia Meza’s regime. And so we 
each found ways to stay keep the people in contact with union leaders like those of the 
COB and the FSTMB which had to operate in secret.17  
 
Women also found ways to publically resist Garcia’s Meza’s government. For example, 
in Huanuni on November 13, 1981 the Housewives’ Committee began a hunger strike to protest 
the imprisonment of their husbands. For Zenobia Machicado, this was her first time participating 
in organized politics. She explained her experience: 
I joined the Housewives’ Committee for many reasons during the dictatorship of Garcia 
Meza. At this time there were many workers in jail. That’s what happened to my 
husband, he was detained. He was in jail and many of his compañeros were too. Because 
of this, women made a decision: we organized and decided to hold a hunger strike. It was 
the 18th of November. My husband was taken prisoner on the 13th of November and on 
the 18th of November we launched the strike.18 
 
The women’s decision to hold a strike in clear opposition to the military dictatorship 
immediately caught the attention of the public. National and international journalists came to 
publicize the strike and lend their support to the strikers. Surprisingly, the government conceded 
to the women’s demands and freed their husbands within a few days. After freeing the women’s 
husbands the military urged the women from Huanuni to return home. Some women refused 
because they knew that many of their allies, including university students, bankers, factory 
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workers and peasants remained in jail. A few days later the government freed many of these 
people as well, and the women finally lifted their strike.19  
 
III. A More Permanent Transition to Democracy 
  The success of the Huanuni women’s strike foreshadowed the decay of the regime. In July 
of 1982 Garcia’s government, which now represented a cross between warlordism and 
cleptocracy, was taken over by civilians. Pressure from the United States, which included cutting 
all US-backed aid programs in Bolivia, contributed to the military’s decision to withdraw from 
politics.20 With the military at least temporarily forced into the background of Bolivian politics, 
an alliance between some of Bolivia’s leftist parties, called the UDP, gained widespread support. 
This alliance helped elect Hernán Siles to the presidency. He had been an important leader in the 
1952 revolution and had also been president of Bolivia from 1956-1960. 
Another big success for the mining women during this period was the creation of the 
National Housewives’ Committee. This had been a goal of members of the Housewives’ 
Committee since its founding in 1961, but it was not until the mid-1980s that women garnered 
enough support to make this demand a reality. At first, many men and women including active 
members of the Housewives’ Committee did not think it was necessary to have a national 
organization; for issues that affected mining centers across the nation, they rationalized that they 
could turn to the FSTMB for support. Besides this implicit subordination of the women’s 
committee to the national miners’ union, social norms supported by both men and women 
rejected the notion that women could organize themselves at a national level. However, by the 
mid-1980s, the acceptance of such norms had changed dramatically. Women were eager to 
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achieve independence from the FSTMB and local miners’ unions.21 After finally convincing the 
FSTMB to approve of their plans to form a national committee, a group of women activists 
traveled to mining centers across Bolivia for support. 22 Norma, who would become the president 
of the national committee, discussed how many men still rejected the idea of a national women’s 
organization. She explained, “There were some who didn’t think there should be a national 
committee. And so we tried even harder to move forward with our plans.”23                                                                                                                             
As women traveled from one mining center to the next, relations between the mining 
centers and the national government again soured. Even though Siles sympathized with the 
miners, the country’s crumbling economy made working with them very challenging.24 In the 
1980s Bolivia’s growth rate was declining slowly, and the nation’s inflation was at an alarming 
level, reaching the three digits in 1983.25 The working class wanted socialism, but the 
government argued that implementing socialism was impossible; Bolivia’s debt and dependence 
on foreign nations for development made socialism unfeasible. The left interpreted these 
arguments to mean that the government had yet again sold them out for their own economic 
interests.26 Zenobia’s description of the years between 1982 and 1985, the three-year period 
when the UDP controlled Bolivia, in many ways represented the working class’ frustration with 
Bolivia’s return to democracy in the early 1980s:  
Eighty-two, eighty-three, eighty-four passed, and the neoliberal governments controlled 
from the outside, from people who send money, again began to mistreat the leaders [of 
the mining centers].  Not by imprisoning them but through economics. There wasn’t 
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food. The private companies, like always, hid what we needed most. There wasn’t wheat; 
there wasn’t sugar, or bread to eat.27 
 
As Zenobia’s quotation suggests, the left’s demand for a socialist government stemmed largely 
from the widespread food shortages during this period. This phenomenon was not unique to 
Bolivia but occurred throughout Latin America. The lack of basic goods combined with the 
COB’s increasing ungovernability turned the tide of Bolivian politics against the left. It became 
clear that something had to be done about the economic crisis (in the first six months of 1985 
inflation reached 8,170 percent per annum), and middle-class citizens began to believe that the 
left-leaning government did not have the strength to stand up to labor. 28 They though that they 
needed new political leadership to implement the difficult austerity packages that would enable 
them to receive funding from entities like the IMF and the World Bank.29  
Faced with a plunging economy and an openly rebellious working class, early elections 
were called to find a solution to the government’s impotency.30 The COB realized that elections 
would threaten their current position of influence over the national government, and so the COB 
began to work against democratization.  In March of 1985, thousands of members of the mining 
community went to La Paz in a political demonstration to try and delay democratic elections. 
They brought their dynamite with them and tried to demand a transfer of power from the Siles 
government to the workers. These marches, which would later be called the Jornadas de Marzo, 
or March Days, lasted for nearly a month. An estimated 10,000 men and women participated.31  
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The March Days demonstrated that the mining communities were not always committed 
to the democratic process. Zenobia explained what motivated the mining communities to stage 
this politically disobedient demonstration: 
In La Paz, we began a permanent march because all Bolivian governments, whether they 
be dictatorships or neoliberal governments had psychologically abused the workers by 
not paying them the wages that they deserved. There wasn’t food for their wives. So, in 
my understanding this is mistreatment, right? Because of this us women had to march.32 
 
A document released by the FSTMB confirmed that the primary motivation of the march 
was the hunger of the families in the mining center. Entitled, “The primary reasons for our 
mobilization,” the document outlined the reasons that the entire mining community should 
participate in the “march for hunger.”  The first sentence of the document urged entire families to 
participate to end the “hunger that exists in our families. The hunger that is already destroying us 
every day and hour.”33 Through stalling a transfer of power, the mining activists hoped to 
convince the current government – which was at least sympathetic to their plight – to find new 
solutions to meet their current basic needs. 
After nearly a month of unending political demonstrations, the mining activists left the 
capital defeated. Then, in July of 1985 the Bolivian government held new elections and political 
control swung in favor of the right. Despite this undesirable outcome, the march did serve to 
reinforce female miners’ public visibility as fierce political advocates for working class rights. In 
response to women’s participation in this event, Bolivian artist Luis Rico wrote a song about the 
women. The song stated that women from the Bolivian mines were no longer simply housewives 
(amas de casa). Through political demonstrations, they had become household weapons (armas 
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de casa).34 The strength of these armas to casa would be tested again shortly in the upcoming 
face-off between the Bolivian national government and the mining centers.  
 
IV: The Fight Against 21060 
In 1985 Paz Estenssoro was reelected President, and his new government quickly set out 
to address Bolivia’s critical economic situation. This new government embraced the North 
American economic philosophy known today as “shock therapy” or the sudden liberalization of 
the nation’s economy. This theory argued that the sudden withdrawal of the national government 
from the national economy would lead to economic stability. The “shock” part of this theory 
referred to the immediate social unrest that the government’s withdrawal would cause, but the 
term “therapy” explained that this was a necessary evil to righting a country’s tanking 
economy.35,36  
Using this theory, the Bolivian government issued a far-reaching economic plan drawn 
up by Harvard Professor and economist Jeffrey Sacks (who also coined the term Shock 
Therapy). 37  Both the IMF and the World Bank approved, and upon its implementation these 
institutions began lending to Bolivia again.  Most significantly for the Housewives’ Committee, 
the plan ended state control of the most important tin mines, which meant the virtual end to 
COMIBOL. The plan further stipulated the closing of all non-productive mines, including Siglo 
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XX.38 These decrees stunned the mining communities because it meant that the majority of 
mining families would shortly find themselves without a job or a home. According to Aqui, a 
progressive Bolivian newspaper, the implementation of the decree would result in the firing of 
about eight thousand workers, or about 90 percent of all miners working for COMIBOL.39 The 
plan included a re-location bonus to help fired workers find new employment, but the bonus was 
minimal. 
Immediately recognizing the threat this decree posed to their communities and families, 
members of Housewives’ Committees across the country began to organize to stop its 
implementation. Gumercinda explained, “The decree 21060 produced the ‘white massacre’ that 
meant that the workers really were going to be without work. This massacre is when us women 
really demonstrated our value.”40 First members of the Housewives’ Committee began hunger 
strikes in various locations across Bolivia. The government actively tried to capture all strikers to 
prevent their resistance from gaining support. To avoid being caught, some women performed 
their strikes in secret. Others prevented the government from disrupting their strikes by 
threatening to blow up city blocks with dynamite if the government dared to enter.41  
Their strikes lasted for a total of 18 days. However, they proved ineffective in uniting the 
working class against the new decrees. After the strike, the women returned to their respective 
mining districts and began preparing for their next political demonstration. Recognizing the life-
threatening consequences that the government’s new decrees would cause the mining 
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communities, mining activists rightly called this demonstration the Marcha por la Vida, or the 
March for Life. Domitila explained the factors that premeditated the March for Life:  
The government had decided to dissolve the mines. They had told us that there was a 
mineral crisis, that our minerals no longer competed with minerals abroad… that the 
mines had to be closed but they hadn’t paid us for six months. For six months we were 
dying of hunger… We didn’t want this, so we began to walk to La Paz and this was 
called the March for Life.42  
 
The March for Life was organized by the FTSMB in August of 1986. Men, women and 
children from mines across Bolivia participated. The miners’ federation also asked for support 
from many different groups, especially other sectors of the labor movement. Arguing that the 
closing of the majority of the Bolivian mines would greatly reduce the power of organized labor, 
the miners urged teachers, factory workers, and gas workers, for example, to come out in defense 
of the miners’ source of income. Many responded to the miners’ plea; a total of 11,000 people 
participated. 43 
In this pivotal working class demonstration, women played a key role. Norma from Siglo 
XX commented on the importance of women’s participation: “Women especially took the lead 
because we saw the situation from our position as mothers.  We wanted it to be solved because in 
the mines, women typically have four, six even ten children. To raise ten children without a job 
source, jeez! It was painful.”44 Miriam Rojas from the mining center Cami reiterated the 
importance of women’s participation in the March for Life. “Other female leaders and other 
organizations are not as battle-hardened. Women miners say we’re going to do something and 
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we do it, without fearing the consequences. With this mentality we participated in the March for 
Life.”45  
  After meeting in Oruro, the marchers set off for La Paz. They walked for six days before 
arriving in Calamarca. There, they were met by the military. Zenobia explained the experience, 
“They attacked us in Calamarca. We were defenseless: workers, housewives, without arms or 
anything. The military surrounded us like a concentration camp. We couldn’t move forward or 
backward.” Emiliana explained how she fought against the military: 
 “When they surrounded us in Calamarca, the military began to let off shots. The women 
had little kitchens, with pans to boil water for breakfast. And so we turned these on. Then 
when the police came to kick us out, we used a ladle to get out the boiled water and threw 
it at them. With boiling water!46  
 
Despite their high tolerance for fear, the marchers realized that were they to continue forward 
with their plans, there was a very real possibility that the military would choose to massacre 
them. Defenseless and exposed, the leaders struggled to decide whether or not they should move 
forward or turn back. After much deliberation, they decided to go back to their respective mining 
districts.47  
  This initial failure did not mean acquiescence. Shortly after the failed march, women from 
mining districts across Bolivia came together to host another hunger strike to protect their 
incomes and their style of life in the mines. Women from Huanuni, Siglo XX, Cataví, San Jose, 
el Sud Bol, Kiri and more participated.  Again their demonstration was interrupted by the 
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military. After three days, the military men came in and gassed everyone.48 After this additional 
failure, strikes continued, but none were successful in stopping 21060.  
The fear of losing their jobs was compounded by the fear of losing their community. 
Mining centers were very close-knit because of the communal set-up as well as the fact that 
many of their members participated in unions. Emiliana described the increasing desperation of 
mining women as they realized that they would likely soon lose not only their families’ only 
sources of income, but also their way of life: 
We had lost the March for Life. We had no other option. But what were we going to do in 
the streets? We didn’t know how to live in cities. In the mines sometimes we would 
knock on the door of our neighbors, and would say, “lend me sugar, lend me rice, lend 
me bread,’ that’s what it was like. And so we couldn’t live in the cities. For this reason 
we didn’t want to leave.49 
 
Afraid of losing their social networks and ignorant of city life, the Housewives’ Committees 
continued to spearhead demonstrations against 21060. All of their attempts met only limited 
success. 
 
VI. Relocation and the Destruction of the Housewives’ Committee’s Political Power 
 
Starting in late 1986, the fear of losing their community and being forced to live in 
unfamiliar and hostile neighborhoods became a reality for most mining families in Bolivia. They 
accepted their small compensation packages – a part of the relocation plan designed by the 
government – and set off for different cities across the country. The majority went to 
Cochabamba or La Paz, but others went to places with hotter climates including Santa Cruz and 
La Chapare. The psychological stress and loss of income caused by this forced migration 
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frequently resulted in tragedy. Norma remembers how one worker killed his wife and children 
because he refused to watch his family die slowly from extreme poverty.50 This type of story was 
not unusual.51   
Miners who left the mining centers soon found life in the cities to be everything that they 
had feared it would be; as they expected, the term “relocation” was a euphemism for their future 
unemployment. There were no jobs for ex-miners or their families. Domitila explained the 
desperate situation:  
Sanchez de Lazado [the Planning Minister] had said it was going to be a relocation. 
Relocation meant they were going to take your from one type of work and give you 
another. But they didn’t do that, that’s not what happened. Miners were thrown into the 
street without anything, without anyone. Then they forgot about the miners.52   
 
In the cities, miners struggled to find new work for a number of reasons. First of all, they 
had no working experience other than mining, meaning that they had no marketable skills. 
Secondly, due to the fact that so many miners had worked in the mines for 10 or 20 years, they 
were often too old or too sick to develop expertise at a new trade. On top of that, prejudices kept 
miners from finding work or even housing. Domitila explained how challenging it was for 
miners to find work:  
It was difficult because when you told people you were “relocated” the employers didn’t 
give you work. Our children were not accepted at the schools and we were refused even 
renting a house, with the excuse that we were ill with “the mining sickness” and that we 
could be contagious. That’s why many families had to live in tents outside of the city.53  
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An article written in Aquí confirmed that many mining families were “treated like lepers” by 
private companies, employers and entire communities upon arriving in new cities.54  
The implementation of 21060 not only severely impacted the living conditions of miners 
and their families, but also led to the disintegration of the Housewives’ Committee’s political 
power. Emiliana explained the impact 21060 had on the mining women’s political presence: 
“Women miners no longer participate in larger politics. We were totally made to disappear. Now 
we don’t participate in anything. We are not taken into account.”55 Zenobia also discussed how 
women from the mines lost their power and unity after leaving the mining centers:  
In the mines us women developed class consciousness, a conviction to fight for everyone 
else, for people who don’t have anything….The only thing that pains me is that women 
miners, because we were forced to leave the mines, are not occupying any political 
space.56  
 
       Zenobia’s reflections suggest that even though female miners’ personal identification 
with the mines continued long after they had moved from the mines, the physical distance 
between them prevented the women from ever finding enough unity to reestablish a mining 
women’s committee with any real influence. This did not mean that women leaders from the 
mines returned to their homes and removed themselves from the political sphere. To the 
contrary, women continued to fight cohesively for different issues relevant to their new 
communities. However, their lack of unity and the space between them kept their activism in the 
background of national politics, and it has stayed there ever since the late 1980s. Zenobia spoke 
about this unsettling reality: "There just aren’t any opportunities.”57  
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VI. Democracy’s Betrayal of the Bolivian Miners 
  The last stage of women miners’ political movement demonstrated that democracy was at 
best a fickle friend to the mining communities of Bolivia. In 1977 the women miners’ movement 
won fame and respect for risking everything for the return of democracy. But then, once the 
military government rescinded control, miners realized that Bolivia’s democratization process 
would not necessarily develop into the political system that the miners had imagined. Quickly 
following Banzer’s withdrawal from politics, it became clear that the long period of military rule 
had greatly corrupted Bolivia’s already weak democratic foundations. Political parties 
multiplied, and the nation (especially the right) became increasingly disillusioned with the 
democratic process. The coup of 1980 in many ways reflected the nation’s frustration with 
Bolivia’s unstable democracy.  
During Garcia Meza’s two-year dictatorship, the mining centers fought bravely in 
defense of human rights and political liberty. But once democracy returned in 1982, members of 
the mining community again did not receive what they expected from the new civilian 
government. The new government, led by the leftist coalition the UDP, was supposed to 
represent the interests of the working class. However, the miners became frustrated when the 
government refused to commit to its radical agenda. The UDP argued that its hands were tied: 
the country’s growing debt and need for foreign aid made the implementation of socialist 
policies impossible. The miners interpreted the nation’s dependence on foreign aid as evidence 
that the government had again sold out to international interests and consequently became less 
willing to compromise. As the left turned its back on the UDP, the majority of Bolivian voters 
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interpreted this growing divide as evidence that the left was incapable of addressing the nation’s 
needs.58  
By 1985, the mining centers actually channeled their activism against democratization. 
During the March Days, ten thousand members of the mining community traveled to La Paz and 
rioted to try and stop the government from holding early elections; they did this because they 
knew that if elections were called, a candidate of the right would win, and they knew that a right-
wing government could threaten their livelihoods (which it did).    
In less than ten years, women of the mines went from staging an indefinite hunger strike 
for early democratic elections to protesting continuously to stop early democratic elections. 
Despite this radical swing, it is likely that the women from the mines saw no contradiction 
between these two actions. This is because in Latin America, the term “democracy” can mean 
different things; some people use definitions that are outcome-based, and some people use 
definitions that are process-based.59 In the United States, the definition of democracy is process-
based: a country is democratic if it holds fair elections, etc. But in other parts of the world and 
especially Latin America, some people understand democracy as outcome-based; they think a 
country is not a true democracy unless resources are distributed fairly among citizens. The 
following quotation by Domitila suggests that women from the Bolivian mines interpreted 
democracy to mean just that. She explained: 
Bolivia is such a rich country, oh there are so many minerals. There are vegetables, 
there’s gas, there’s fruit and so many vegetables. It’s so varied and so beautiful. And so 
Bolivians have so much wealth, we should live well. But there are so many children who 
don’t have a home, who live under bridges taking drugs. There are poor people who don’t 
have anywhere to sleep, who don’t have a house, who don’t have anything. For this 
reason we fought for democracy for so many years. 
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Recognizing these two divergent definitions of democracy not only helps explain the 
mining center’s seemingly hypocritical activism, but also illuminates both the failures and the 
successes of the movement. The implementation of 21060 prevented the women’s movement 
from achieving long-term “democracy” in the outcome-based sense of the word; different strikes 
successfully improved living conditions in the short-term, but ultimately they were unable to stop 
the central government from shutting down their communities’ primary source of income. As a 
result, most mining families moved to cities. In these new locations, the majority continued to 
struggle to survive. 
On the other hand, their movement did play an important role in making Bolivia a more 
democratic country in terms of the process-based definition. Firstly, female miners were 
important protagonists in the nation’s struggle to build a democratic nation that respected the 
human rights of their people. Their strike in 1977 was clearly very crucial in Bolivia’s return to 
democracy. Their long-term resistance against military rule was also critical in the struggle to 
bring democracy back to Bolivia. 
 Mining women also made their nation more democratic through improving women’s 
representation in politics. From virtual absence in the 1960s, by the late 1980s women’s political 
role was clearly respected. Testimonials from women mining activists confirmed how mining 
women reshaped social norms regarding gender and politics. María from Siglo XX reflected on 
how many prejudices women faced when they first joined the committee and how that changed 
over time:  
A lot of husbands didn’t want their wives to go to meetings with other women or go out 
and fight. They just wanted their wife to stay at home in the house and take care of the 
children and fulfill other household responsibilities. But we overcame this wall, this 
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barrier that was put on us by our husbands… Along with fighting in the committee, we 
also had to fight with our husbands so that we could take a step forward.60  
 
Zenobia’s experience in Huanuni also expressed women’s success in changing social norms 
through demonstrating their usefulness to the working class. She explained that over time, “the 
men realized that women can fight, without their help, without anyone’s help.”61  
Various articles written in Bolivian newspapers also highlighted how women miners had 
become publically accepted as important advocates in the working class struggle by the 
implementation of 21060. Dramatic headlines like, “The Women will fight: we’re staying where 
we are!”62 and, “Housewives would rather die fighting alongside their compañeros before 
accepting the destruction of our income”63 demonstrated that social norms no longer confined 
women to the home. Rather, it was widely recognized that mining women would use their entire 
political prowess to stand alongside their husbands and fight to preserve their communities and 
way of life. Clearly these women had carved out a new place for women in national discourse 
and by doing so changed the way that Bolivians understood gender, leadership, and politics. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
60
 Lagos, Nos hemos forjado así, 246. 
61
 Machicado, interview by Raney. 
62
 Gaston Lobaton Mendoza, Las Mujeres Lucharemos; Estemos Donde Estemos, Semanario Aquí, 
Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores de Bolivia Archives, ISSH, trans. by Catherine Raney. 
63
 Gaston Lobaton Mendoza, Las amas de casa prefieren morir peleando al lado de sus compañeros, 
Semanario Aqu,. Federación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores de Bolivia Archives, ISSH, trans. by 
Catherine Raney. 
 
  
Conclusion: Remembering the Movement of the Female Miners 
 
Throughout the entirety of the women miners’ movement, women organized and acted 
collectively to challenge political oppression and mitigate the effects of extreme poverty. Near 
the end of the revolutionary period, women staged two important hunger strikes in 1961 and then 
again in 1963. In both cases, women risked their physical health to protest the imprisonment of 
workers and the lack of available food. During the military dictatorships, women’s activism 
came to focus more exclusively on human rights abuses and slightly less on economic 
repression. Especially after the massacres during General Barrientos’ regime and the methodical 
targeting of activists during General Banzer’s regime, women relied heavily on the language of 
human rights and liberation to win support for their protests. Then, when Bolivia began its 
unpredictable and disappointing democratic process, the rhetoric of women’s activism changed 
from an emphasis on political liberties to protecting their husbands’ right to work.   
Throughout this period, women also employed compelling tactics to win attention for 
their issues. Their hunger strikes were often their most powerful tool because they highlighted 
women’s commitment to using non-violent strategies to win humanitarian support for their 
cause. On the other hand, women were also not afraid to use dynamite, an explosive used in the 
excavation of minerals, to protect themselves from being forcefully removed from their strikes. 
On many different occasions women wrapped themselves and even their children to prevent the 
military from ending their demonstrations prematurely; they would then threaten to blow 
themselves up, and the entire building up, if the government did not listen to their demands. 
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Throughout this period, women also employed compelling tactics to win attention for their 
issues. Their hunger strikes were often their most powerful tool because they highlighted 
women’s commitment to using non-violent strategies to win humanitarian support for their 
cause. On the other hand, women were also not afraid to use dynamite, an explosive used in the 
excavation of minerals, to protect themselves from being forcefully removed from their strikes.    
Despite the fact that their tactics did not ultimately protect their communities from the 
implementation of 21060, their movement was not a failure. Rather, the movement played an 
instrumental role in bringing democracy to Bolivia. The most famous example of their role in 
establishing civilian rule was the strike of 1977, but numerous other actions also were significant 
in the return of democracy. Chapter 2 explored the numerous tactics, ranging from publishing 
manifestos about human rights abuses to raising their voices at great personal risk against the 
militarization of their communities. To this day, Bolivians still enjoy the political liberties that 
these women fought to establish. Bolivian’s still complain of the government’s lack of 
transparency, but those who experienced the coups of the 60s, 70s, and 80s know there is much 
to be thankful for.  
Of equal importance, the movement also led to a number of personal transformations that 
continue to affect community activism and women’s activism. Chapter 1 explored how women’s 
participation in politics awakened a political consciousness of mining women across Bolivia. 
Once women became aware of this responsibility, it enabled them to stand up to social norms 
that confined women to inferior, subordinated roles. 
Another important product of this movement was women’s realization of the importance 
of their paid and unpaid labor. Chapter 2 explored how women, through participating in politics, 
came to recognize how their labor was critically important to the reproduction of labor in the 
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Bolivian mines. This new categorization of their own labor gave women increased confidence, 
and also challenged the traditional hierarchy which categorized female work as less important.  
Chapter 3 addressed another important change that the women miners’ movement 
caused: the new political culture that was receptive to women’s participation. Chapter 1 showed 
how their early activism convinced the miners’ unions to rethink their position on women’s 
activism. Chapter 2 demonstrated that mining women’s commitment to their people’s struggle 
allowed them to receive increasing responsibilities in their local unions. The third chapter 
demonstrated that political culture had changed so much, that male and female activists finally 
recognized the importance of building a nation-wide Housewives’ Committee. 
 Even though it has been over 30 years since women from the mines held national 
political influence, these changes that ultimately led to the acceptance of women as political 
activists are still evident. Domitila in an interview in 2009 reflected on women’s role in 
contemporary politics under the current indigenous president, Evo Morales. She commented, 
“[Women] have more participation in every area these days. Evo Morales has appointed women 
as ministers and that shows we´re gaining ground.”1 María from Siglo XX agreed: “Of course 
there still is machismo. But things are changing; women have taken an important step forward.”2  
 
  A final important change caused by women’s activism was how it changed women’s 
understanding of how women’s oppression fit into the broader struggle of working class 
activism. At first, women willingly subordinated their own interests for the sake of the working 
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class as a whole. This was seen in chapter 1 when women willingly gave up their goal of having 
a nation-wide movement because the FSTMB was not ready for such a radical idea. This was 
also seen in chapter two when women frequently prioritized community-wide initiatives over 
ones that were more specifically designed to address women’s needs. However, this changed in 
the final stage of the struggle, when women decided that now was the time to build a national 
movement. This shift showed that by the end women were no longer convinced that their 
subjugation could be addressed only after the system was changed. Rather, they came to see a 
deep connection between women’s liberation and the process of their communities’ liberation. 3 
This transformation in political thought regarding the relationship between women’s 
activism was permanent. In an interview with the Latin American Press in 2009, Domitila 
reiterated an important lesson that her movement had learned through its activism: women need 
to free themselves before they can fully defend their communities. She explained, “That’s why I 
think that the first battle Bolivian women need to win is in the home.”4  
The development of this relationship between gender and class has important 
implications for Bolivia’s current government, which is now struggling with issues regarding its 
colonial heritage, multi-ethnic citizenry, class conflict, and lack of economic development. To 
address these issues and empower citizens, the government might first think to address its 
machista culture, which, while improved, still prevents many women from raising their voices to 
facilitate change.  
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  Studying the mining women’s movement also reveals some of the ways that the United 
States impacted Bolivia’s political and economic trajectory. During the Cold War, the United 
States backed anti-communist coups and regimes like that of Banzer and looked the other way 
when these governments committed human rights abuses. The only time that the United States 
sided with the people was during Garcia Meza’s regime. Later, North Americans played an 
instrumental role in Bolivia’s shift towards neoliberal economic policies. This change appears 
more forgivable given the country’s fiscal crisis, but the real impact of these policies deserves 
close scrutiny. On one hand, “shock therapy” effectively addressed the nation’s inflation5 (in just 
a few years, Bolivia’s four digit inflation rates dropped to a more reasonable number), but the 
failure of neoliberal economic policies was also great. In the next decade, unemployment rates 
rose and economic growth faltered. The only industry that thrived was the production of 
cocaine.6  
This work does not look at the comprehensive effects of the United States’ influence in 
Bolivia, and therefore cannot make any normative statements about the United States’ role there. 
However, by looking closely at the detrimental effects US foreign policy had on women from the 
Bolivian mining centers, this work serves to remind us that as United States citizens we must be 
very critical of our nation’s impact; because of our ability to enormously affect small land-locked 
countries like Bolivia, we must also hold ourselves accountable to understanding our historical 
impact so that we can make informed decisions in the present.  
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Today the cocaine industry remains dominant, and US-Bolivia relations are currently 
structured by the War on Drugs.7 In the same way that vulnerable mining groups were targeted to 
stop the spread of communism during the Cold War, impoverished coca farmers who often have 
tenuous connections to the cocaine industry are now the ill-chosen targets of the our nation’s 
intervention in Bolivia. The study of the women’s mining movement makes us consider, what 
fragile communities might we eliminate without knowing?  
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Glossary 
 
 
Political Figures 
 
Victor Paz Estenssorro: A key political figure in the political group the MNR, Paz Estenssoro 
was president of Bolivia from 1952-1956 and 1960-1964. He was overthrown in 1964 by a coup 
led by General Barrientos. Estenssoro became president again in 1985 through 1989. During his 
presidency, the government implemented the decree 21060.1 
 
Hernán Siles Zuazo: Another important figure in the MNR, Hernán Siles Zuazo was president of 
Bolivia from 1956 to 1960. He was reelected President in 1982 as a member of the UDP party 
and led the country until 1985.2 
 
Juan Lechín Oquendo: Lechín led the FSTMB from 1944 to 1987. He was vice president of 
Bolivia from 1960 to 1964. While Bolivia was under the control of dictatorships, he was 
frequently forced into exile and tortured.3 
 
René Barrientos: A grand orator with indigenous heritage, Barrientos led a military coup in 1964. 
His regime ended in 1969 when he died in a helicopter crash.4 
 
Alfredo Ovando Candía: A military populist, Ovando tried to win the support of the left during 
his short dictatorship from 1969 – 1970.5 
 
Juan José Torres: Also a military populist, Torres led Bolivia from 1970 – 1971. He was a victim 
of Operation Condor in Argentina in 1976. Operation Condor was a repressive program 
supported by the United Sates. This program was used to stamp out communist and left-leaning 
ideas from the Southern Cone. 6 
 
Hugo Banzer Suárez: From Santa Cruz, Banzer led a military coup in 1971 and controlled the 
country until 1978. He was also elected president in 1997 and served as president until 2001. 
 
                                                      
1
 James M. Malloy and Eduardo Gamarra, Revolution and Reaction: Bolivia, 1964-1985 (New 
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 Lupe Cajías, Historia de una leyenda: vida y palabra de Juan Lechín (La Paz: Ediciones Gráfricas EG, 
1988). 
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 César Soto, Historia del Pacto Militar Campesino (Cochabamba, Bolivia: CERES, 1994.) 
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 Malloy and Gamarra, Revolution and Reaction, 41-54. 
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 Patrice J. McSherry Predatory States: Operation Condor and covert war in Latin America (Laham, MD: 
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Luis García Meza: One of Bolivia’s most corrupt and violent dictators, García Meza led a coup 
in 1980. His regime ended in 1982. He has been tried and convicted for his role in the cocaine 
trade, but not for committing human rights violations.7  
 
Important Acronyms  
 
MNR: The Movimiento Nationalista Revolucionario or the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement 
was founded in 1941. This movement led the People’s Revolution of 1952.8 
 
UDP: The Unidad Democrática y Popular or the Democratic and Popular Union was an 
umbrella political party that united different leftist parties.9  
 
COMIBOL: The Corporación Minera de Bolivia or the Mining Corporation of Bolivia is the 
name of Bolivia’s nationally-owned mines. COMIBOL was created in 1952 after the People’s 
Revolution.10 
 
COB: The Central Obrera Boliviana or National Trade Union Federation was created in 1952 
and was granted semi-autonomous power with the MNR over the workers of Bolivia. This 
federation is still enormously important in contemporary Bolivian politics. 11 
 
Decrees and Terms 
 
21060: Issued in 1986, this degree greatly reduced the state’s role in the local economy. Part of 
the decree ordered the closing of the majority of mining centers in Bolivia.12 
 
Shock therapy: This economic philosophy was developed in the United States and argued that 
the swift liberalization of the economy would lead to economic stability. The decree 21060 
employed many of the recommendations outlined by this philosophy.13 
 
MINING CENTERS 
 
Siglo XX: Located in the department of Potosi, this mining center along with Cataví was the 
most politicized and most organized during the mid-20th century.14 It was closed after the 
implementation of 21060. 
 
                                                      
7
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Huanuni: Located in the department of Oruro, this was another highly politicized mining center. 
It did not close after the implementation of 21060. 
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